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I. INTRODUCTION
Should a court vacate either its own decision or the decision of a lower
court at parties' request so that, with such "vacatur on consent," settlement
will occur? Should courts vacate decisions "as moot" when parties settle after
those decisions are issued but while petitions for rehearing or certiorari are
filed or notices of appeal pending? At first glance, vacatur may seem a
narrow issue, of technical interest only. Yet this question, which has recently
prompted an extensive debate in case law and commentary, is not for
proceduralists alone. Nor is it happenstance that state and federal case law
addressing this question has suddenly mushroomed and that the United States
Supreme Court has agreed to hear cases with various iterations of this issue.'
In responses to vacatur on consent lie the central problems of fin-de-siecle
procedure: What value should be accorded adjudication? What limits, if
any, should there be on courts' encouragement and facilitation of settlement?
Who owns lawsuits, the risks they entail, and the decisions generated in their
wake? What do the words "public" and "private" mean in the context of
court decisions? How should one balance litigants' autonomy and third party
interests in litigation?
To demonstrate that these major questions of social policy reside in the
specific issue of vacatur on consent, I begin with three recent cases, Izumi
Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.,2 Neary v. Regents of the
University of California,3 and U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall,4 in
which judges struggle with the problem of vacatur. After sketching the
contours, I turn to how the case law on vacatur illuminates contemporary
values about the utility and desirability of adjudication. This is a time of
transition; competing ideologies are evident in the struggle for the definition
of the work and purpose of courts. Therefore, tensions exist between the
burst of litigant autonomy (represented by the vacatur on consent cases of
Neary, Bonner Mall, and Kaisha) and two defining characteristics of con-
1. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114 S. Ct. 1367, 1368
(1994) (submission of new briefs on question of whether settlement while the case was pending
before the Supreme Court required vacatur of the Ninth Circuit and trial court opinions), discussed
infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text; Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (per curiam dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted because the
issue of petitioner's standing to intervene was not properly presented), discussed infra notes 28-40
and accompanying text.
2. 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993). See infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
3. 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992). See discussion infra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
4. 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994), briefing on effects of
stipulation of settlement ordered, 114 S. Ct. 1367, 1368 (1994). See infra notes 41-51 and
accompanying text.
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temporary procedural developments: the ascendancy of judicial control of
litigation (embodied in managerial judging)5 and the growing interest in
aggregating cases into ever larger amalgams (resulting in the subordination of
individual control over cases and in formal and informal preclusion).
With the advent of managerial judges has come ever-growing pressure
to control litigants and their lawyers; in contrast, with vacatur on consent,
litigants gain the authority to revise judicial opinions. Aggregation tech-
niques and preclusion doctrine demonstrate contemporary understandings of
the interrelationships among cases and of the third party effects of decisions
between one set of litigants. Vacatur works to undo a decision made, and
hence, to attempt to limit its subsequent power.
These competing impulses-let parties settle in any way they can, yet
control litigants to maximize the utility of decisionmaking-complicate even
the descriptive story to be told. Although some judges and commentators
write that vacatur on consent is an impermissible attempt at "rewriting
history"6 and "erasure," 7 those phrases fail to capture the variety of con-
sequences and the confusion that occurs when judgments are vacated by
consent, in contrast to when vacatur is predicated upon a legal defect.
Adjudication has occurred, sometimes with attendant publicity. While some
federal circuits have held that opinions vacated on consent have no
subsequent legal value, other circuits are more reluctant to ignore these
decisions and permit case-by-case evaluation to decide whether a vacated
opinion could be used subsequently as collateral estoppel.' Further, one finds
judges relying on cases vacated by consent because they offer "persuasive
authority."9  And on occasion, one can even find trial judges balking at
5. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982) [hereinafter, Resnik,
Managerial Judges].
6. See, for example, Judge Frank Easterbrook's opinion in In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d
1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988) ("History cannot be rewritten."); Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The
Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlementand Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 589
(1991).
7. Brief of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice in Support of Petitioner at 1, Izumi
Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-1123)
[hereinafter TLPJ's Amicus Brief, Kaisha].
8. Compare Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138,
1146 (2d Cir. 1992), affd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993) with Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944
F.2d 647, 649-51 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1761 (1992) (issue for which certiorari was
requested was about vacatur on consent, 60 U.S.L.W. 3690 (Apr. 7, 1992)) and Chemetron Corp.
v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983). See infra
notes 123-140 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey,
160 B.R. 882, 898 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("a logical and well-reasoned decision, despite vacatur,
is always persuasive authority"); IBM Credit Corp. v. United Home for Aged Hebrews, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4372, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Once a decision has been filed and in the public
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taking back what has happened and refusing appellate court mandates to
vacate judgments.'" When judges hedge, recycling vacated decisions and
muddying the effects of vacatur, judges reflect contemporary views about the
value of their work, the inter-connections among different cases, and about
the desirability of using the outcome in one case to affect another. Thus,
enthusiasm for judicial control, aggregation, and preclusion peek through
even when judges are asked to vacate judgments as part of settlement, as does
judicial ambivalence towards this settlement practice.
Vacatur on consent thereby reveals the complexity of the contemporary
procedural story. On the one hand, on almost every occasion, judges and
lawyers extol the virtues of settlement and the desirability of enabling private
accommodations among litigants to end disputes without state-authored
adjudication. The bench and bar champion court houses with "many
doors,"" in the hopes that disputants will voluntarily abandon their disputes
either before adjudication is required or while an appeal is pending. Some go
further and urge mandatory alternative dispute resolution and sanctions for
those who insist on adjudication, but do not demonstrate its utility. On the
other hand, as new allegations of harm become the subject of litigation, from
tort claims of toxic substances to corporate malfeasance to the criminal
docket, the links among cases and litigants are plain. Calls for aggregate
processing-for state control over litigants to subordinate individual interests
to those of the larger group-are also a regular feature of the current litigation
landscape.
After setting forth these trends and the tensions among them, I then
turn to appraise these developments. Should they be lauded, lamented, or
met without much emotion? To decide whether there is anything troubling
about parties' requests that judges "set aside" judgments and hold them "for
domain, its influence beyond any effect on the parties is based solely upon future readers' views of
its merit, whether vacated in connection with a settlement or not so vacated.").
10. See, e.g., Benavides v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (D. Colo.
1993); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. (WMATA) v. One Parcel of Land in Prince
George's County, Md., No. CIV.A.HAR88-618, 1993 WL 524783 (D. Md. Nov. 22, 1993). See
infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
11. Prof. Frank Sander is credited with the vision of a "multi-door courthouse." See Frank E.
A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Before the National Conference on the Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111
(1976). Infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. For discussion of the ideological premises of
alternative dispute resolution and their relationship to adjudication, see Judith Resnik, Many Doors?
Closing Doors? The Relationship between Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication (The Schwartz
Lecture in Dispute Resolution, Mar. 4, 1994), OHIO ST. J. DiSp. RESOL. (forthcoming 1994).
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naught,"'" one must evaluate the current celebration of alternative dispute
resolution, and particularly of settlement, and its impact on the under-
standing of the judicial role.13 That discussion forms the concluding
portions of this essay.
Vacatur on consent is a vivid moment of judicial involvement in
settlement. Jurists across the country are urging such involvement, and
vacatur on consent could be understood as simply another tool by which to
encourage settlement. Although more visible than the pretrial settlement
conference in which judges advise parties on the viability of claims, vacatur
on consent is not categorically distinguishable because, like other means of
promoting settlement, it demonstrates a preference for parties' agreements
over adjudication. As one fashions arguments for and against the practice,
one constantly returns to questions about the nature and meaning of courts,
the value of adjudication, and the desirability of litigant control over the
shape, timing, nature of relief, and mode of conclusion of a dispute.
Opponents of vacatur on consent claim it aberrant, a sport, a species
different from what courts commonly do. However, vacatur on consent is
not as foreign as some portray it. Parallels can be found in the practices of
expunging arrest and conviction records, in authorizing sealed judgments and
records, and in depublishing opinions. Further, vacatur is not a novel
presentation of the proposition that parties can, as a part of their settlement,
enlist a court to provide them with what Judge Frank Easterbrook has termed
a "public act of the government.""4 When called a "consent decree," such
12. This phrase comes from a 1942 Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States.
See COMMITTEE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMM. ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME 20 (1942). The Committee
proposed a statute to reform sentencing, id. at 14-20, including the capacity to expunge sentences
of youthful offenders. See Draft of an Act Recommended by the Committee to Provide a
Correctional System for Adult and Youth Offenders Convicted in Courts of the United States, id.
§ 13, at 20. See also Federal Corrections Act and Improvement of Parole: Hearings on H.R. 2139 and
H.R. 2140 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 5-6
(1943) (committee proposal transmitted to Congress). In redrafting, Congress replaced the phrase
"held for naught" with language stating that a youthful offender could obtain a certificate to "set
aside" a conviction and that such certification would have "the same effect as a pardon." See
UNITED STATES ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES 18-19 (1946). As finally enacted, the Federal Youth Corrections Act
(FYCA) authorized convictions to be "set aside." 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1950) (repealed 1984). See
infra notes 157-174 and accompanying text. Neither the Committee's Report nor the legislative
history discusses the meaning of either the phrase "held for naught" or "set aside." See Doe v.
Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1235 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
13. For discussion of other recent innovations in contemporary procedure suggesting that we
as a polity have declining interest in adjudicatory judgments, see Judith Resnik, Judgment Held "For
Naught," (The Levine Lecture, Oct. 1993), FORDHAM L. REv. (forthcoming 1994).
14. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988).
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a "public act" is routinely entered either before or after adjudication of claims
in trial courts across the United States.
Absent some effort to fashion a line between trial and appellate courts
(i.e., that settlement efforts are peculiarly the domain of the trial level), it is
difficult to distinguish the consent decree authored by the parties and
routinely entered by the trial judge and the settlement agreement that courts
(at any level) enable when they vacate decisions on consent. Both consent
decrees and vacatur on consent avoid imposing risks on litigants of further
conflict and of the uncertainty of litigation, and both accede to litigants'
express desires for closure based on party-fashioned resolutions.
Another critique of vacatur argues that it is inefficient. That claim
assumes the propriety of permitting vacatur on consent but argues either that
it fails to bring about settlements promptly or that it imposes costs by
diminishing the utility of decisions for third parties. 5 Others adopt the
opposite posture: that vacatur enables settlements that would not otherwise
occur and thereby conserves both private and public resources for the disputes
that require attention. 6 The efficiency calculation is not only dependent
upon different views of the effects of the availability of post-decision vacatur
but also on assumptions of what use third parties may make of a decision
produced in a previous litigation and of settlements that occur prior to
adjudication. At issue is what obligations one imposes on disputants and
courts towards potentially-interested third parties.
It is because of these third parties that vacatur on consent has been
termed unfair; litigants concerned about precedent (proverbial "repeat
players") may, by means of vacatur on consent, gain advantage by the
possibility of shopping effectively in the "market" of trial and appellate court
opinions and presumably controlling the shape of case law and precedents.
However, vacatur on consent may also equip "one-shot" players with more
bargaining power than they would otherwise have to buy off risky appeals and
avoid facing total defeat. Further, unlike many settlements before trial,
vacatur on consent is often visible and may provide third parties (including
one-shotters) with information that would have been confidential, had
settlement predated a published or "on line" judicial opinion. 7 But this
advantage, that vacated opinions have a tendency to reappear as "law" and
15. See, e.g., Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justice Blackmun, in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425, 429 (1993).
16. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 126 (Cal. 1992), infra notes 18-27
and Judge Ralph Winter's discussion in Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d
Cir. 1985) discussed infra notes 55, 181, 185-187, 192 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 84-104.
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are relied upon by other courts despite having been vacated on consent,
prompts yet another critique-also related to efficiency. Given the ambiguity
that can inhere in the gesture, vacatur on consent may be undone in practice.
A final challenge to vacatur on consent posits that it violates public
values because it is (somehow) basically incompatible with the role of courts.
That complaint is undermined not only by the existence of analogous
practices, such as consent decrees, but also by a myriad of contemporary
developments that promote, as a matter of public policy, the settlement of
disputes and the diminution of the role of formal adjudication. Indeed, a
celebration of settlement can often be heard in the judicial opinions that
authorize vacatur on consent, and such celebration can also be found in both
trial and appellate court creation of settlement programs. Those judges who
dislike vacatur have not, thus far, broadened their critique to include other
forms of promoting settlement, nor do they register objection to efforts to
settle pending appellate cases.
When judges, whom we might imagine to be the most dedicated
protectors of traditional judicial processes, vocally promote settlements and
when many of them join in shaping rules like vacatur on consent to inspire
parties to settle, we (non-judges) must pause to hear them. A host of
participants-lawyers, judges, litigants-see adjudication as a second best
solution. That view, that judgment itself is "for naught," is key to
understanding the reformation of civil litigation at the end of this century.
If vacatur on consent is impermissible, then the concerns of those who
advocate its prohibition should also prompt reconsideration of other late
twentieth century innovations currently viewed as unproblematic adaptations
to case loads and to litigants' (and judges') desires to escape the miseries of
litigation.
II. SETTING THE FRAMEWORK: VARIATIONS ON VACATUR
When parties ask judges to vacate decisions because of settlement, judges
often respond by making statements about the meaning and nature of the
work that they do when deciding cases and when facilitating settlements.
Details of three of the dozens of reported cases illuminate when such requests
are made and the exchanges among judges and litigants about the propriety
of vacatur on consent.
A first example is Neary v. Regents of the University of California,"8 a
libel action about why some 850 cows died. In 1979, veterinarians employed
18. 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
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by the University published a report claiming that those cows, owned by
George Neary, died from mismanagement, rather than from being sprayed
with toxaphene, a chemical provided by health officials for pregnant heifers
possibly exposed to scabies mites.' 9 George Neary sued, alleging that he had
been libeled. After extended litigation, including the grant and reversal of
summary judgment for the defendants20 and a four-month trial,2' a jury
awarded Neary seven million dollars. While the defendants' appeal was
pending, the parties informed the appellate court of their settle-
ment-contingent upon action by that court. All the court was supposed to
do was to reverse or vacate the jury verdict.2 The intermediate appellate
court said no. The Honorable J. Anthony Kline wrote that, while the parties
were free to settle (and therefore dismiss the pending appeal), they could not
insist that an appellate court change a jury judgment as a part of that
settlement.2 3 In his view:
As imperfect as the process of trial may be, it is the way in which our society
establishes legal truth. Because it is an adjudicative and not simply a dis-
positional act, the reversal of a judgment not thought to be legally erroneous
simply to effectuate settlement would trivialize the work of the trial courts and
undermine the integrity of the entire judicial process.
2 4
That decision sparked considerable controversy,25 as has the decision of the
California Supreme Court, reversing the intermediate court and creating a
"strong presumption" in favor of such requests. As that court explained: "[als
a general rule, the parties should be entitled to a stipulated reversal to
19. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 773, 774 (Ct. App. 1991).
20. Neary filed his libel action in 1979 and amended it in 1982. In 1984, the trial court
rendered summary judgment for defendants on the grounds that California law privileged the
publication of the report. In 1986, the California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the
questions of whether the publication involved a "policy decision" and whether it was required to
be published presented triable issues of fact. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 230 Cal. Rptr. 281,
286 (Ct. App. 1986).
21. Neary, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 777 ("producing 63 volumes of reporter's transcripts comprising
nearly 13,000 pages").
22. Id. at 774 ("the parties have advised the court that stipulated reversal is a condition
precedent to their pending settlement of this litigation and that dismissal of the appeals will not
suffice"). See discussion, infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text, on the confusion about
whether the parties were seeking "vacatur" or "reversal."
23. Id. at 778.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Appeal Court Won't Erase Decision in Libel'Lawsuit, 104 L.A. DAILY
J., Mar. 7, 1991, at 3; Philip Hager, Justices to Review Plea to Set Aside Libel Ruling, L.A. TIMES, May
24, 1991, at A41, A42 ("justices' ruling would resolve an important issue that has divided lower
courts"); George Markell, Court Scolds Lawyers in Post-Verdict Deal, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 7, 1991, at
A10; see also California Academy of Appellate Lawyers, Amicus Letter Supporting Grant of Review
(May 15, 1991) (on file with author).
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effectuate settlement absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances that
warrant an exception."" The Supreme Court ruling, in turn, has prompted
members of the California legislature to propose a statute declaring that:
judgments in civil matters are public acts which, once entered, should not be
subject to alteration by private agreement and that these agreements are,
therefore, violative of the public policy of this state.
7
The debate about vacatur on consent is by no means confined to the
state courts. In 1993, in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips
Corp. ,2 the United States Supreme Court took up but then declined to rule
on the merits of the issue. The Court had granted certiorari to decide
whether federal appellate courts should "routinely vacate district court final
judgments at the parties' request when cases are settled while on appeal,"' 9
but held instead that the litigant (Izumi) objecting to that vacatur had not
preserved the question of its standing to raise the issue. 30 Kaisha brings into
focus an additional aspect of the issues illustrated by Neary-third parties'
interests in the outcomes of cases to which they are not named disputants.
26. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 121 (Cal. 1992). Press coverage of
responses to the decision include Stephen R. Barnett, Judgments for Sale, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 27,
1992, at 6; Gail D. Cox, Innovation-orJust Court Triage?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1992, at 1, 10; Daniel
B. Moskowitz, California High Court Enters Fight over Wiping Rulings off Books, WASH. POST, Aug.
31, 1992, (Magazine), at 11; see also Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication
and Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033, 1061 (1993)
[hereinafter Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear] (decision is "one-sided and poorly reasoned....
more partisan and less candid than the briefs of the parties").
27. Cal. 102, Cal. 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (to amend § 128 (a)(8) of the Cal. Code of Civil
Procedure) (introduced Jan. 13, 1993 by Senator Lockyer). Atone point, the bill was modified to
permit such stipulations upon a showing of "substantial legal or factual justification." See Cal. 102,
Cal. 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1993), as amended May 13, 1993, approved by the California Senate on
June 7, 1993; see also 152 CAL. SENATE WKLY HIST. 81 (Feb. 3, 1994). Thereafter, the bill was
referred to the California Assembly, which first deferred consideration because the Kaisha case was
pending before the United States Supreme Court and then, after comments from the California
Judges Association, deleted the modification to return the bill to the text cited above. See Letter
from Constance Dove, Executive Dir., California Judges Association to Assembly Member Phil
Isenberg (March 29, 1994) (on file with author); Assembly amendments of May 26, 1994 (CA-
BILLTXT 1993 CA.S.B. 102 (SN)). As of this writing, the bill is before the Assembly Judiciary
Committee. Interview with Senator Bill Lockyer's staff in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 1993; June,
1994).
28. 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993).
29. Id. at 426.
30. Id. at 428. Izumi had been a litigant at some phases of the dispute, see infra notes 32-40,
81, but was not a party to the immediate litigation, and its motion to intervene at the appellate
level had been denied. Izumi had not challenged that decision in its certiorari petition. 114 S. Ct.
at 426.
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Kaisha involved neither ranchers nor cows but whether the distribution
of electric razors violated antitrust and federal trade laws.31 In 1984, in a
federal court in Florida, Philips sued a distributor, the Windmere
Corporation, for trade dress infringement and sued both Izumi (a competing
manufacturer of electric razors)32 and Windmere for patent infringement and
unfair competition.33 Both defendants filed counterclaims.34 After partial
summary judgments and jury decisions,3" Philips lost both the unfair
competition and the antitrust claims; the jury awarded Windmere $89.6
million, plus attorneys' fees and costs. 36 While Philips' appeal was pending,
Philips and Windmere settled; Philips agreed to pay $57 million, and
Windmere agreed to join Philips in seeking vacatur of the judgment, which
the Federal Circuit then granted.37
31. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 729-30 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Philips v. Windmere I1].
32. According to one of the opinions, "[o]nly two entities in the free world manufacture rotary
electric razors-Izumi... and... Philips." U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 85
C 5366, 1987 WL 26123, at *1 (N.D. I11. Dec. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Philips v. Sears I]. The Izumi
razors were distributed by Sears Roebuck, Windmere Corporation, and others.
33. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 680 F. Supp. 361, 363 (S.D. Fla. 1987), rev'd, 861
F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir. 1988), [hereinafter Philips v. Windmere I]. "Trade dress" violations are based on
claims of illegal copying of the distinctive elements of either the packaging of a product or its
ornamentation and configuration, claimed to have acquired secondary meaning, thereby causing
consumers to be confused. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
34. Izumi counterclaimed that Philips' patent infringed on Izumi's patent rights and was thus
invalid. Windmere counterclaimed that Philips was violating antitrust, anti-dumping, and other
laws. Based on a contract between Izumi and Windmere, Izumi financed the trade dress and patent
defense, while Windmere financed the antitrust counterclaim litigation. See Brief for the Petitioner
on the Merits at 2-3, Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-1123) [hereinafter, Kaisha Supreme
Court Merits Brief.]
35. After discovery, the trial court granted partial summary judgment for Philips. Philips v.
Sears 1, 1987 WL 26123 at *1, *15. In 1986, Philips moved for a directed verdict on the antitrust
claim. At that time, Windmere withdrew its dumping claims under the Robinson-Patman Act, its
state law claims, and its Clayton Act claims. The trial court determined "[r]eluctantly" that
Windmere had not presented evidence sufficient to "create a jury question on... willful acquisition
or maintenance of monopoly power .... " Philips v. Windmere 1, 680 F. Supp. at 363. Thereafter,
the jury decided the patent infringement claim for Philips and ordered Izumi to pay Philips $6500
and held for Windmere on the unfair competition claim. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., No. 85 C 5366, 1992 WL 159447, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 1992) (denying cross-motions
for summary judgment).
Windmere appealed the directed verdict and won its reversal. (Izumi did not appeal the patent
infringement verdict against it.) See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695 (Fed. Cir.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. North Am. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 490 U.S. 1068 (1989)
[hereinafter Philips v. Windmere II].
36. Philips v. Windmere III, 971 F.2d at 729. See Court Will Consider Vacatur of Judgments After
Settlement, 45 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 341 (1993).
37. Philips v. Windmere 111, 971 F.2d at 730-31; Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 426. The Circuit
described that, while vacatur on consent is "the general rule," courts are not required to grant it
"whatever the circumstances." 971 F.2d at 731.
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Kaisha expands the problem illustrated by Neary not only because it
moves from the state to the federal courts but also from litigation like Neary,
which while precedent-setting, appeared to be unlikely to be relied upon by
third parties, 38 to facts that make plain the relationship between vacatur on
consent and preclusion doctrine. Patent and copyright infringement have
been the context for major developments in preclusion law. 39 Not only was
Izumi involved in another action with Philips but so was Sears, also a
distributor of Izumi razors; the Philips-Izumi-Windmere litigation had been
used preclusively in the Philips-Izumi-Sears litigation." Thus, the Federal
Circuit had before it demonstrated reliance on the decision by another court
and another party.
A third example of vacatur on consent moves to yet another legal
context, bankruptcy, and yet another pattern of activities that prompts the
question of the relationship between settlement and vacatur. In 1986, the
Bonner Mall partnership bought a mall in Bonner Country, Idaho. In 1991,
prompted by U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Company's foreclosure efforts, Bonner
38. While the parties in Neary had argued about the relevance of collateral estoppel to the
propriety of granting vacatur on consent, the California Supreme Court refrained from addressing
the issue as not properly presented. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 125 (Cal.
1992).
39. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); see
also Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1971 (1993) (overturning the
Federal Circuit's practice of "routinely vacating declaratory judgments regarding patent validity
following a determination of noninfringement").
40. In 1985 (one year after it commenced litigation against Windmere and Izumi in Florida),
Philips commenced-in an Illinois federal court-another similar case, against Izumi and Sears,
which also distributes Izumi razors. After Philips prevailed in the initial round of litigation in a
Florida federal court, Philips sought to use that victory affirmatively, to preclude Izumi from
pursuing antitrust claims in the Illinois litigation. In 1987, the Illinois federal court held that
Izumi's antitrust claims were "compulsory counterclaims" that had not been raised in the Windmere
litigation and were therefore barred. Philips v. Sears I, No. 85 C 5366, 1987 WL 26123, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 2, 1987). In 1988, that trial court also held that Philips could continue to pursue
infringement violations against Sears but that Philips' failure to bring its patent claims against Izumi
in the Florida litigation precluded it from pursuing Izumi in the Illinois case. U.S. Philips Corp.
v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 85 C 5366, 1988 WL 64545, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1988)
[hereinafter Philips v. Sears II].
In 1990, the Illinois court granted Sears' motion for summary judgment based on the fact that
because Philips had lost the claims in the Florida Philips v. Windmere litigation, Philips was
collaterally estopped from pursuing its trade dress claim against Sears. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., No. 85 C 5366 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1990) (order granting summary judgment),
referred to in U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 85 C 5366, 1992 WL 296361, at *1
(N.D. 11. Oct. 14, 1992) [hereinafter Philips v. Sears III]. However, once the Florida Philips v.
Windmere litigation ended via Philips v. Windmere III with vacatur on appeal, the Illinois federal
court withdrew its conclusion that Philips was collaterally estopped and reinstated the trade dress
claims against Sears. Philips v. Sears Ill; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Sears Roebuck & Co. at
2, Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-
1123) [hereinafter Sears' Amicus Brief, Kaisha].
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Mall Partnership filed for bankruptcy and initially obtained bankruptcy law's
automatic stay of the foreclosure proceeding.4 The bankruptcy court later
determined that Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code did not permit approval,
over the objection of unpaid creditors, of a reorganization plan in which the
original owners would continue their ownership because of their contribution
of "new value."42 The federal district court reversed, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, permitting this "new value exception,"43 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this major question in bankruptcy
law."
About a month before the case was to be argued, the parties entered into
a "consensual plan of reorganization,"45 which was confirmed by the
bankruptcy court. No mention was made in the agreement about vacatur of
judicial decisions. Thereafter, Bonner Mall (the reorganized debtor) filed
with the United States Supreme Court a request that the petition for
certiorari be dismissed as moot. U.S. Bancorp (the debtor who had objected
to the "new value exception") agreed but also requested that, although the
"parties did not ... discuss or reach any agreement relating to vacatur of the
decisions below," the Supreme Court vacate those rulings. 46 The Supreme
Court responded by calling for new briefing on the question of the legal
consequences of "voluntary settlement of the parties. ""
Bonner Mall offers another dimension of the problems thus far
exemplified by Kaisha and Neary. What impact do settlements, subsequent
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
42. In re Bonner Mall Partnership, No. 91-00801-11,1991 WL 330784, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1991). At stake is what bankruptcy lawyers refer to as the "new value 'exception' to the absolute
priority rule." See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) & (C)(ii).
43. In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 142 B.R. 911 (D. Id. 1992), aff'd, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir.
1993).
44. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (granting
certiorari to respond to whether the "new value 'exception' to the absolute priority rule survived
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978"). The Solicitor General not only filed an
amicus brief (on behalf of the FDIC and the RTC, both of whom are secured creditors in
bankruptcy cases and opposed the "new value exception") but was also granted leave to participate
in the oral argument. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114 S. Ct. 1215
(1994). See Michael H. Strub, Jr., Competition, Bargaining, and Exclusivity Under the New Value Rule:
Applying the Single-Asset Paradigm of Bonner Mall, 111 BANKING L.J. 228, 230 (1994) (reviewing
issues raised by Ninth Circuit decision, which was the first circuit to "squarely address" whether the
new value exception "survived" codification of the "absolute priority rule").
45. This description comes from the Brief of the United States As Arnicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 3, U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114 S.Ct. 1367 (1994)
(No. 93-714) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus, Bonner Mall].
46. Brief of Petitioner at 11-13, U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114
S.Ct. 1367 (1994) (No. 93-714) [hereinafter, U.S. Bancorp Merits Brief, Bonner Mall].
47. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114 S. Ct. 1367 (1994).
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to adjudication, have on decisions even in the absence of parties' bargaining
to vacate rulings? While the Supreme Court has held that activities
unrelated to the parties-"happenstance"-can require mootness, 48 at issue
in Bonner Mall is the interrelationship between the pendency of a case (on
appeal, on petition for rehearing en banc, on cert.) and settlement. Should
the legal ruling of the Ninth Circuit, which has stood as the "law" on new
value since August of 1993, be redacted because of an agreement made in
March of 1994 to settle the underlying dispute?49 Should the stage at which
settlement occurs,50 or the likelihood of appellate revision5' affect courts'
willingness to vacate because of settlement? At issue is the relationship
between litigant-borne risk, intrinsic to the pendency of litigation, and court-
issued decisions.
In Neary and Kaisha, trial judges had undertaken the adjudication of
legal claims and juries had found facts, one party had noticed an appeal, and
then the parties requested that appellate courts vacate decisions as a part of
their settlement. At that point, someone not directly a party to the
deal-either another litigant or a judge-protested, and judges had to
articulate the propriety of discarding an adjudicated decision. In neither
Neary nor Kaisha did the parties expressly argue that the adjudications sought
to be vacated were flawed legally or factually.
However, in both, there are intimations that litigants are signaling by
vacatur on consent weaknesses in the decisions to be vacated. In Neary, the
48. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950).
49. Apparently, vacatur is a phenomenon occurring with some frequency in bankruptcy cases
within the Ninth Circuit, although the conditions under which vacatur occurs vary. See, e.g., In
re Newberry Corp., 161 B.R. 999, 1000 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1994) (on motion of parties to "vacate and
annul," decision reported at 145 B.R. 998 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1992), vacated); In re Specialty
Plywood, Inc., 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 43 (Bankr. 9th Cir., Mar. 30, 1994), vacating 160 B.R. 627
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993) (while an appeal was pending before the Ninth Circuit of the 1993 decision,
the parties settled; vacated on parties' settlement); In re Tucson Indus. Partners, 990 F.2d 1099 (9th
Cir. 1993), vacating 129 B.R. 614 (Bankr. 9th Cir., 1991) (settlement agreement was "reached by
the parties before the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision was issued").
50. This is the distinction advanced by Judge Amalya Kearse, in Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cit. 1993) (distinguishingNestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc.,
756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985) as a rule permitting vacatur of trial court opinions, subject to review
"as of right," as contrasted with appellate court opinions, that are final subject to review provided
only at the discretion of either an appellate court's rehearing or rehearing en banc or of the
Supreme Court).
51. In Bonnet Mall, the argument advanced is that because district court civil decisions in
"private" cases are reversed in under 20 percent of the cases, but the Supreme Court revises
decisions in some 70 percent of the cases it decides, vacatur of cases settling while pending before
the Supreme Court is more appropriate than at the trial court. U.S. Bancorp Merits Brief, Bonnet
Mall, supra note 46, at 32-33.
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litigants flirted with a request for reversal,52 and in Kaisha both Philips and
the United States (as an amicus in the United States Supreme Court) argued
that a settlement on appeal itself raises questions about the quality of the
decisionmaking below." In Bonner Mall, the United States (again as an
amicus) repeated that theme, that settlement "reflects... [an] unwillingness
to insist on the rights accruing" under a judgment, and therefore that the
judgment itself is not worth preserving.
54
III. ASSESSING THESE DEVELOPMENTS
A rich and growing body of law and practice thus debates vacatur on
consent. The federal courts are split on its propriety and import.55 The
52. See infra text accompanying notes 115-117.
53. Philips Brief on the Merits as Respondents at 4-9, Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-
1123) [hereinafter Philips Merits Brief, Kaisha] (detailing the basis for Philips' appeal on the merits
and then arguing that, by settlement, the parties "recognize... that the validity of the unreviewed
judgments is uncertain"); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
27-28, 33, Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-1123) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha]
(parties who seek vacatur demonstrate that they are "not willing to be bound by the district court's
judgment [but have reached] a resolution that, from the combined perspective of the parties, is more
just than the judgment they seek to have vacated") (emphasis in the original); see also discussion
infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
54. U.S. Amicus, Bonner Mall, supra note 45, at 6; 12, 29; see also U.S. Bancorp Merits Brief,
Bonner Mall, supra note 46, at 14-15 (participating in settlement "suggests that the decision below
may be less reliable"). In some instances, parties are able to convince courts to turn litigant dislike
of opinions into judicial pronouncements. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Big Defendants Settle in
Miniscribe Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at D-4 (a trial judge "signed decisions that said that
the [jury] verdicts were 'not supported by sufficient evidence' and were 'contrary to the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence;"' the trial judge is quoted as explaining that he struck the
verdicts "only as a result of the settlement, not as an independent decision that the jury verdict was
bad or anything.").
55. Several different approaches exist, in part because the issue arises under varying
circumstances. The Seventh Circuit rule, announced by Judge Frank Easterbrook, is that "[w]e
always deny these motions to the extent they ask us to annul the district court's acts, on the ground
that an opinion is a public act of the government, which may not be expunged by private
agreement." In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988); In re United States, 927
F.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Garde, 848 F.2d 1307, 13 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
A recent Tenth Circuit decision invokes the Seventh Circuit but permits case by case decision-
making. See Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1444 (10th Cir. 1993) (reviewing all
the circuits' law).
The Second Circuit refuses to permit vacatur on consent of appellate opinions but authorizes
vacatur on consent of trial court opinions. See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11
F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1993); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir.
1985) ("Because the policies favoring finality of judgments are intended to conserve judicial and
private resources, the denial of the motion for vacatur is counterproductive because it will lead to
more rather than less litigation."). Similarly, the Third Circuit has two formulations, one
disapprovingof vacatur on consent in strong terms (see Clarendon Ltd v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936
F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1991)), and the other distinguishing Clarendon because, unlike that case
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treatise writers disagree. 6 Within the last year, both the Tenth and Second
Circuits have expressed their concern about the practice. 7
The conflicts generated by these requests demonstrate the tension
between the willingness to vacate on consent, illustrated by Neary and the
Federal Circuit opinion in Kaisha, and three other critical markers of current
litigation: enthusiasm for settlement, managerial judging, and societal interest
in aggregation of parties and claims, with the accompanying doctrinal and
practical effects of precluding repetitive litigation of related issues. Vacatur
on consent is a particularly vivid moment in which, given its relative novelty
and many judges' felt need to explain their decisions on such requests, judges,
lawyers, and commentators articulate the values in conflict. Thus, in the
construction of arguments about the propriety of vacatur on consent, one
finds efforts to explain the meaning and purpose of adjudication and of the
non-adjudicatory roles of courts.
A. Litigants' Revenge?
Over the past decades, judges have gained increasing authority over the
pretrial process and the configuration of lawsuits themselves. One source of
involving monetary damages, the trial court's injunctive order imposed a "legal bar" to settlement.
See Orocare DPO, Inc. v. Merin, 972 F.2d 519, 522 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Ninth Circuit requires that a trial judge weigh "the hardships and equities ... between
the competing values of finality of judgment and right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes."
Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982).
See also Bates v. Union Oil Co., 994 F.2d 647, 650-52 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1761
(1992).
In the Federal Circuit, the issue is committed to judicial discretion, but the presumption is in
favor of vacatur. Philips v. Windmere III, 971 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted sub nom. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 114
S. Ct. 425 (1993), discussed supra notes 28-40. See also Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Products
Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (vacatur of General Services Board of Contract Appeals'
decision).
56. Compare 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3533.10,432-34,
443-44 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1994) (advocating, in 1984, flexibility to "settle pending appeal on
terms that require vacatur of the district court judgment," and then in 1994, noting that this
position has met with some resistance by appellate courts; reviewing the arguments and concluding
that, while courts "can and should protect the precedential value of district court opinions rendered
before settlement [, they] need not, and should not, attempt to protect the more dangerous values
of nonmutual preclusion in ways that make it more difficult to settle on appeal") (Supp. 1994 at
298), with 1B JAMES WM. MOORE, Jo DESHA LUCAS, & THOMAS S. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.41616] (2d ed. 1993) ("It would be quite destructive of the principle of judicial finality
to put [an appellant who settles] in a position to destroy the collateral conclusiveness of a judgment
by destroying the right of appeal." (citing In re Memorial Hosp. with approval)).
57. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1993); Oklahoma
Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436 (10th Cir. 1993).
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that control is the rise of "managerial judges.""8  Another is the ability of
judges to insist that litigants combine their actions, by consolidation and
multi-district litigation, so that the judiciary can consider related problems
together.59 This increased judicial authority has come at the expense of the
autonomy of at least lawyers, if not also their clients. As judges insist on
their authority to sanction, monitor, and exercise more power over the
pretrial process, some complain of a loss of lawyer and litigant power to
control the course of litigation.61 Others bemoan the loss of their own "day
in court." 62  Some academics have described the change as the incor-
poration of continental, and specifically inquisitorial, modes of judging into
United States forums, with a concomitant diminution of lawyer and party
control.63
In a world in which trial judges have emerged as powerful figures who
frequently override parties' choices and impose management plans, Neary and
Kaisha could be seen as the "litigants' revenge."64  Whatever constraints
judges may impose, litigants' autonomy is vindicated when courts validate the
desires, wishes, and deals of the litigants by vacating on consent the opinions
and verdicts of judges (and juries). To be sure, the numbers are few. Most
58. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 5, at 391-402.
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988) (multi-district litigation); FED. R. Civ. P. 42 (consolidation).
See generally Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1991, at 5 [hereinafter Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation"].
60. See, e.g., Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding
a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 789-90 (1981); Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery
Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CAL. L. REV. 264, 267-71 (1979). See also Note, The Emerging
Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1044-45
(1978).
61. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift
and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 507-509
(1980). In contrast, some research describes attorneys as welcoming judicial involvement in both
discovery disputes and settlement negotiations. See, e.g., WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUrrs
56-64 (1985) (variation among responding lawyers, with 46 percent overall believing that judicial
involvement increases the likelihood of fair settlements); Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front
Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 219, 247 (nearly 70 percent of responding attorneys stated that they did not receive sufficient
help from courts in resolving discovery disputes). Cf. G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions-Differing
Values: A Comment on Judge Parker's Reformation Model for Federal District Courts, 46 SMU L. REV.
1935, 1967 (1993) (criticizing claims of lawyer contentment with judicial promotion of ADR).
62. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 193, 198-99 (1992) (discussing the perception and whether such autonomy is overstated).
63. Those who have celebrated German civil procedure for its activist judges argue that such
modes of adjudication are preferable to more adversarial forms. See John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
64. Whether Bonner Mall will be cited as another example depends upon the Supreme Court's
ruling, to occur in the 1994-95 term.
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litigants never make it to trial,65 let alone to a request for vacatur of
judgments. But given that I am working with Neary and Kaisha at an
emblematic as well as at a literal level, their import could be understood as
a major counterweight to trial judges' powers. Depending on where one
thinks we are in this story, Neary and Kaisha could be read as either the
resurgence or the last gasps of litigant autonomy, and hence in conflict with
contemporary trends that cabin and control the options for litigants.
B. The Nature of the Litigant Autonomy Claim: One-Shotters, Repeat
Players, and the Interests of Third Parties in Litigation
Litigant autonomy is a generic assertion that demands unpacking to
learn about what forms of or which litigants' autonomy can be enhanced by
vacatur of trial court adjudication. Although one might assume that every
additional procedural option augments litigants' autonomy, in a world of
strategic interaction (to wit, litigation), one litigant's autonomy may expand
at the expense of that of an opponent. Further, there are other litigants,
waiting in the wings, some of whom are "repeat players," while others
participate on a "one-shot" basis.66 Because civil procedure aspires to offer
options that can inure to the benefit of all categories of litigants,67 were it
clear that vacatur on consent distributed benefits unevenly and in a manner
different from other settlement procedures, its use should be curtailed.
1. Effects on the Parties to the Dispute
Settlements that involve vacatur may be of interest to some litigants
more than others; the obvious candidates are repeat players, presumably
concerned about the shape of the law in general as well as in the specific
application in a given case. How might vacatur on consent affect that shape?
65. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 1992 at Table C-4 (of 230,750 civil cases filed in
period ending Sept. 30, 1992, 8,038 (3.5 percent) "reach(ed]" trial"); David M. Trubek, Austin
Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer, & Joel B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary
Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89-93 (1983) (of more than 1,600 cases sampled by the Civil
Litigation Research Project, fewer than 8 percent went to trial).
66. Marc Galanter first explored these terms in this context in Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing how
such repeat players can "play" for the regime of rules as well as for outcomes in particular cases).
67. For discussions of two tenets of civil procedure-its claimed "neutrality," which is in turn
premised on the presumed "interchangeability" of civil litigants (appearing sometimes as plaintiffs,
sometimes as defendants)-see Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219,
2224-26 (1989).
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Vacatur of trial court opinions is a means of avoiding future deployment of
a decision-assuming, for the moment, that consequence of vacatur on
consent. 68 In Kaisha, one goal was to avoid a second court from relying on
the first judgment for collateral estoppel.69 In Bonner Mall, the United
States also argued that vacatur would relieve the Supreme Court from
deciding a major issue of law and "leave the questions open" for new
decisions, presumably coming out the other way. 70 Avoiding preclusion is
not the only advantage that might flow from vacatur on consent. Litigants
may feel the repercussions of verdicts not only in lawsuits but also in other
contexts, such as when professional codes impose sanctions or initiate
discipline because of findings of malfeasance, 7' or because of other
institutional rules, such as insurance companies raising premiums as the result
of judgments. The very existence of a reported opinion might also be seen
as an encumbrance, influencing behavior.
One can therefore assume that not all litigants care equally about the
existence of recorded judicial opinions and that repeat players are more likely
than one-shotters to be proponents of vacatur?2 Evidence that this strategic
option inures to the benefit of these litigants comes not only from some of
the cases in which such settlements have been offered,73 but also from the
68. See discussion infra at Section III.C, The Consequences of Vacatur: Judicial Roles in
Promoting Settlement and the Sanctity of Court Judgments.
69. Under federal law, collateral estoppel is not always a consequence of a first decision; a
court has discretion to assess whether reasons exist to mistrust the outcome. See Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
70. U.S. Amicus, Bonner Ma!!, supra note 45, at 30.
71. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10177.5 (West 1987), which states that "[w]hen a
final judgment is obtained in a civil action against any real estate licensee upon grounds of fraud,
misrepresentation, or deceit with reference to any transaction for which a license is required...
the commissioner may . . . suspend or revoke the license." Other licensure codes may not
condition the suspension, revocation, or discipline upon a "judgment" but rather on wrongdoing.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 6106 (West 1990) ("The commission of any act involving
moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption,... whether the act is a felony or misdemeanor or not,
constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension."). These effects of a judgment formed the basis
for a refusal to vacate a judgment, under the "extraordinary circumstances" exception to the
California Supreme Court's Neary doctrine. See Norman I. Krug Real Estate lnvs., Inc. v. Praszker,
22 Cal. App. 4th 1814, 1825 (1994) (opinion not vacated insofar as it established a broker's
violation of his duty of care).
72. Litigants may also want to preserve or create precedent. See, e.g., Alliance to End
Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873, 875-76 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (holding the
case not justiciable and describing that the "plaintiffs, satisfied with the relief they had been offered,
elected to forfeit that relief to obtain a chance on a precedent that would help only strangers").
73. See, e.g, the litigation involving Union Oil Company and its franchisees, described in
Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1761 (1992); a local
government's efforts to obtain vacatur of an opinion involving its liability for an illegal arrest of a
citizen, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, discussed in Clipper v. Takoma Park, 898 F.2d 18 (4th
Cir. 1989), declining to vacate 876 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1989); the insurance company's offer, described
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identities of those who have urged its legality before the United States
Supreme Court and have lobbied the California legislature not to forbid such
agreements. Both the United States Government (repeat player par
excellence) and the Product Liability Advisory Council (whose corporate
members include dozens of companies, including Eli Lilly, Dow Chemical,
Johnson Controls, Philip Morris, and U.S. Tobacco) have called on the
Supreme Court to authorize vacatur on consent of court opinions.74  In
contrast, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (TLPJ), which described itself as a
"public interest law firm that represents victims of the abuse of power in our
society," asked the Supreme Court to halt such practices.
7
On the other hand, repeat players are sometimes on the other side as
well, arguing against vacatur on consent. Sears Roebuck and Izumi, both of
which sought to constrain vacatur in the context of Kaisha, are no strangers
to litigation. Further, several of the published decisions on vacatur include
as avoiding a decision about a policy's enforcement, in Benavides v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
820 F. Supp. 1284, 1285-86 (D. Colo. 1993).
While the United States already enjoys the benefits of the doctrine that it is not subjected to
non-mutual collateral estoppel (see United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984)), the United
States has also made offers that result in the vacatur of opinions, presumably benefitting from the
absence of governing precedent within a circuit or nationally and of case law that would be relevant
to other circuits. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 1355
(8th Cir. 1985), vacating the Eighth Circuit's earlier opinion, at 765 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1985),
which had held that the Secretary had violated a disability recipient's statutory rights. 765 F.2d
at 749. At issue was the interpretation of how a self-employed individual's records of employment
could satisfy the requirement of proving that one had been employed for the requisite number of
quarters to receive benefits. Id. at 749-50.
74. U.S. Amicus, Kaisha, supra note 53; Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents [Philips and Windmere], U.S. Philips Corp. v.
Windmere Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-1020); U.S. Amicus Brief, BonnerMall, supranote
45 at 5-6, 30. According to the Bonner Mall debtor, "the Solicitor General as amicus curiae desires
the Court to establish a general rule that would allow the federal government to use settlement as
a means to eliminate the precedential value of decisions adverse to the government's interests."
Brief of Respondent Bonner Mall Partnership at 8, U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership, 114 S. Ct. 1367 (1994) (No. 93-714). For an example of apparent governmental efforts
to "disguis[e] a settlement" in order to challenge a "legal determination by [a] lower court...
believe[d] to be erroneous," see Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
75. TLPJ's Amicus Brief, Kaisha, supra note 7, at 1. The Trial Lawyers for Public Justice have
also submitted an amicus brief in Boanner Mall and argued that "vacatur destroys much of the public
value of a decision." Brief of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P.C., in Support of
Respondent at 6, U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114 S. Ct. 1367 (1994)
(No. 93-714).
The California Association of Professional Liability Insurers, State Farm Insurance Company,
and the Personal Insurance Federation oppose California legislative efforts to ban such practices.
See Memorandum from the Personal Insurance Federation (Mar. 10, 1993) (on file with author);
Letter from the Professional Liability Insurers to the Honorable Bill Lockyer (Mar. 11, 1993) (on
file with author); Letter from State Farm to Assembly member Phil Isenberg (Mar. 12, 1993) (on
file with author).
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repeat players on both sides, thus suggesting that repeat players may use this
technique not only against one-shotters but also in litigation inter se.
76
Moreover, even if repeat players initiate such settlement offers, the
recipients-sometimes the proverbial one-shot player-may well benefit. The
offer transfers some bargaining power from the repeat player to the one-
shotter.
Two examples make this point. First, let me use the Neary case. What
we know is that Mr. Neary won a $7 million jury verdict and agreed to a
settlement that paid him $3 million.77 I do not know anything about who
would have been likely to win on the merits, had the appeal been heard. But
assume that Mr. Neary (stipulated here as a one-shot player) was at risk of
losing all of the $7 million dollar verdict on appeal. The University of
California-by offering him a $3 million settlement, which he in turn
accepted-gave him sufficient funds to buy his way out of what his lawyers
might have advised was a risky appeal.7" Second, let me turn from this
hypothetical exchange to data about real exchanges; from a few cases, we
know that the offer to settle for vacatur sometimes puts more money "on the
table" than what was awarded at trial.79 Thus, in some cases, a trial court
opinion works to enrich the bargaining powers of a one-shot player.
While repeat players may gain greater utility over time from the
availability of vacatur as a condition of settlement, one-shotters can gain as
76. See, e.g., Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., 936 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1991), involving a
contract dispute between two corporations, one of which had a subsidiary in bankruptcy; Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 888 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1989) involving litigation between the utility
company and New York State's Public Service Commission; and In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d
1299 (7th Cir. 1988), involving a bankrupt hospital and its creditors.
77. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 120 (Cal. 1992).
78. In the actual case, the California Supreme Court majority discussed-presumably in
justification of the quality of the settlement-that Mr. Neary had spent more than twelve years in
litigation and was of advanced age. Id. at 123. Further, the majority repeated that, with that
settlement, the defendant University of California saved four million dollars it would have owed
had the judgment been upheld. Id. at 124-25.
79. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 371, vacated, 621
F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a trial court granted partial summary judgment against the Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Company, found liable for cleaning up an oil leak. Thereafter, upon
application from the Insurance Company, Judge Lasker vacated the earlier order to permit
additional briefing. Bankers Trust, 621 F. Supp. at 685. According to the records in a subsequent
litigation, involving the same insurance company but different policy holders, Hartford paid $2.3
million to BankersTrust, and that sum included $200,000 more than the lower court's value of "the
victorious claim"-paid to settle the case "with the understanding that the opinion would be
withdrawn." See Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1192 n.32
(N.D. Cal. 1988). Credit for locating this example goes to the TLPJ's Amicus Brief, Kaisha, supra
note 7, at 10-11.
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well. When the judicial opinion becomes available as a "bargaining chip,
'"
the purchasing power of litigants grows. When the assumption that repeat
players are the primary movers in making offers to settle for vacatur is coupled
with a second assumption, that they often have greater assets than their
opponents, then the trial court's issuance of a judgment can transfer
bargaining power to the less powerful side, which gains new economic
wherewithal with which to make deals.
Thus, permitting vacatur will sometimes make less well-heeled litigants
possible purchasers. The trial court's work, sometimes characterized as
"wasted," could instead be understood as serving a side that deserved to be
helped-"deserved" it not because that side may be relatively poorer than its
opponent but because the trial court has found that litigant's rights violated.
The practice of vacatur thus enhances the autonomy of litigants on both sides
of a dispute, not just those with deep pockets. Given this evaluation, it
becomes difficult to frame an argument-from the vantage point of the parties
to the dispute81 and even with a keen awareness of the inequality of resources
among litigants-that courts (or legislatures) should outlaw this form of
bargaining.
2. Third Party Access to and Use of Other Litigants' Decisions to Settle
Another form of argument about asymmetry among litigants shifts the
vantage point from the immediate disputants to disputants over time. The
objection here is that vacatur on consent becomes a tool with which repeat
players can shape the law. Judge Sherman Finesilver, Chief Judge of the
District of Colorado (and deeply critical of the practice of appellate vacatur
of trial court judgments), observed:
80. See Judge Easterbrook's opinion, In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302; TLPJ's Amicus
Brief, Kaisha, supra note 7, at 10.
81. Kaisha also raised the wrinkle of how one conceptualizes the "parties." Pursu-
ant to its contract with Windmere, Izumi paid for Windmere to defend the trade
dress and unfair competition claims; it was also a party to the patent infringement
claim, which it lost and paid $6500. However, Izumi did not appeal that issue, and,
while its name was carried on the caption of the pleadings, it was not a "party" to
the subsequent litigation. When Philips and Windmere settled, Izumi sought, unsuc-
cessfully, to participate in the appellate proceedings about the propriety of vacatur.
Philips v. Windmere III, 971 F.2d 728, 730-31 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The appellate court rebuffed
Izumi's efforts to assert standing on appeal. Id. at 731. In the Supreme Court, Izumi's
failure to preserve the question of its standing aborted the decision on the merits.
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425, 428 (1993)
(per curiam).
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In the normal.., operation of the American justice system, each party
walks to the courthouse with a compilation of opinions in its favor under one
arm and a collection of opposing views under the other. ... [O]ne or both
parties may state that "the weight of authority" supports their view. A string
of citations follows....
... Vacatur allows disappointed litigators.., to control the direction
and content of the jurisprudence - to weed out the negative precedent and
preserve the positive - and create an artificially weighty and one-sided
estimate of what comprises "the case law." 2
While Judge Finesilver's discussion is evocative, the impact of vacatur on case
law varies with the level of the court writing the judgment subject to vacatur
and with the speed with which such decisions make it to case law reports and
"on line services."
In general, trial court opinions do not constitute precedent in the formal
sense, although the custom of specific districts may dictate judicial invocation
or distinction of trial court decisions.8 3 Granting vacatur however does not
necessarily affect the subsequent use of opinions that have made their way
into the reported literature, from case reporters to the popular press. To the
extent that adjudication occurred, it may have attracted either press or
scholarly commentary, enabling subsequent reference to it. This aspect of
vacatur-that it comes after adjudication-may actually make it a form of
settlement that inures to the benefit of third parties. Understanding how
82. Benavides v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Colo. 1993).
In Benavides, the trial court found that an insurance policy's incontestability clause
was "ambiguous" and unenforceable. After the insurance company had noticed an
appeal, the case settled, followed by a joint motion to vacate the trial court's
opinion. The Tenth Circuit then remanded with orders to vacate the prior judgment
and to dismiss. Thereafter, the trial court declined "to vacate our prior judgment
pending a reasoned and more detailed order from the Court of Appeals." Id.; see also
Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., 936 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[a] losing party
with a deep pocket should not be permitted to use a settlement to have an adverse
precedent vacated."); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384
(2d Cir. 1993) (vacatur on consent "would allow a party with a deep pocket to
eliminate an unreviewable [appellate] precedent it dislikes simply by agreeing to a
sufficiently lucrative settlement to obtain its adversary's cooperation in a motion
to vacate").
83. Opinions on vacatur include discussions by appellate judges, explaining that
trial court decisions are not "precedent" (see, e.g., Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th
Cir. 1993)), and by trial judges, explaining either that their decisions are "precedent,"
(see, e.g., In re Speece, Jr., 159 B.R. 314, 321 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993)), or that, while not
precedent (whether vacated or not), the reasoning is available to persuade other
judges. See, e.g., In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson &
Casey, 160 B.R. 882, 898 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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vacatur on consent could be useful to third parties requires two (brief)
excursions-into the rules on access by third parties to information created
or collected during the litigation process and into the practices of legal
publishing companies.
a) Access: First, aside from pleadings and motions, pretrial activity is
often beyond public access.8 4 Although the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure created an elaborated pretrial process and a host of discovery
rights, those rules have not been interpreted as requiring public access to that
process. Much of discovery is not accessible. 5 Indeed, some have noted a
84. Courts have generally interpreted the common law (and perhaps
constitutional) right of access to courts to apply, in civil cases, to pleadings,
motions and the documents presented in support of them, exhibits submitted at trial,
and court transcripts of hearings, all of which are presumptively open to the public.
Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1014 (11th Cir. 1992) (pleadings and
motions); In re Continental I11. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1316 (7th Cir. 1984) (exhibits);
Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (First Amendment right of access
to civil proceedings, including hearings on motions). See generally Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991).
85. The rules on access to discovery are somewhat complex; the Supreme Court
has never decided the parameters of either the common law or constitutional rights
of access to discovery in the context of the federal rules. See Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33-34, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984) (analyzing Washington's
discovery rules). Because discovery was not traditionally part of the civil litiga-
tion regime, access to discovery materials may not be constitutionally compelled.
Miller, supra note 84, at 439-441 (identifying a "two-prong analysis" by the courts,
which first considers historical practice and then analyzes the role public access
plays in a particular practice).
Discussion of access to discovery must distinguish between those discovery doc-
uments filed with the court and those in the possession of litigants. Discovery
documents enter court records in two ways, either a) because discovery materials
are submitted in support of litigation positions, or b) because of routine filing of all
documents exchanged by the parties. When discovery documents are filed with
courts as a part of court transcripts, entered into evidence, or attached in support
of dispositive motions, those materials are generally accessible under the pre-
sumption of public access to courts. See, e.g., Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d
527, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1993) (distinguishing "'materials submitted into evidence from the
raw fruits of discovery"' (citation omitted)); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846
F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988) (motion for summary judgment and the accompanying
exhibits previously under a protective order could not be kept sealed unless there
were "some overriding interests in favor of keeping the discovery documents under
seal"). In contrast, some courts do not permit access to discovery when it is
attached to discovery motions themselves. See Leucadia Inc. v. Applied Extrusion
Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1993).
Routine filing of discovery documents with courts is affected by 1980 amendments
to FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) [hereinafter Rule 5(d)], which provided courts with the
authority to exempt "depositions upon oral examination and interrogatories, re-
quests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses" from being
filed. Pursuant to Rule 5(d), many local courts have promulgated rules that, absent
Whose Judgment? 1493
HeinOnline -- 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1493 1993-1994
1494 41 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1471 (1994)
"growing tendency" for parties to agree to "seal documents produced during
the discovery process as well as pleadings and exhibits filed with the
court. "86
Second, express rights of public access have not accompanied the more
recent creation of court-sponsored settlement negotiations and alternative
dispute resolution techniques.8 7 Third, absent certain circumstances such
specific court order, exempt such documents from being filed. See, e.g., United States
District Court for the Central District of California, Local Rule 8.3 (Discovery
Documents-Proof of Service-Filing); United States District Court, for the District
of Massachusetts, Local Rule 33-36(0 (Nonfiling of Discovery Materials). According
to one district, as of 1990, 54 courts had adopted such a "blanket prohibition on the
routine filing of discovery material." Comment to Local Rule 107 for the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. In contrast, and in recognition
of the fact that "in cases of public interest, the press or other nonparties may wish
access to such materials," that district provides for filing of discovery materials
with the court, absent a specific court order entered in specific cases. Id.
Parties may also request that courts protect discovery materials provided to
opponents (and whether filed or not with the courts) from disclosure to third
parties. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). As interpreted, both FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and FED. R.
Civ. P. 5(d) make discovery available to third parties absent court orders, which
should only preclude access upon a showing of "good cause." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
See also Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32-33 (interpreting analogous state rules on
discovery). See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 457.
86. See Nault's Auto. Sales, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25, 43
(D.N.H. 1993). This trend has prompted legislation in some states, federal hearings
and proposed legislation about access to court records, and commentary, both
critical and supportive of third party access. See, e.g., New York Uniform Rules for
the Trial Courts, Part 216.1, 22 NYCRR Part 216 (Feb. 6, 1991) (limiting the power of
courts to seal records); Court Secrecy: Examining the Use of Secrecy and Confidentiality of
Documents by Courts in Civil Litigation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Secrecy
Hearing]; Hearing before the Senate Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (discussing S.1404, "Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1993," which would limit
protective orders, entered under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), so that they would expire at the
entry of final judgment, absent a "particularized finding" that continuing the
protective order "would not prevent the disclosure of information . . . relevant to
the protection of public health or safety;" forbidding "agreements" among civil
litigants that would prohibit or restrict parties from disclosing information to
government agencies) [hereinafter 1994 Secrecy Hearing]; George F. Carpinello, Public
Access to Court Records in Civil Proceedings: The New York Approach, 54 ALB. L. REV. 93 (1989);
Miller, supra note 84, at 429 (critical of "an intense, nationwide campaign" to require
access).
87. Congress authorized court-annexed arbitration but has made no express
provision for public access to the proceedings; the awards themselves become
"judgments" of the court and may thus fall under general rules of public access to
court records. Congress has directed the districts to issue local rules that require
the temporary sealing of awards pending expiration of the time in which to demand
trial de novo. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 654(b)(2)-655. Further, local rules provide for the
places at which such proceedings occur (e.g., in courtrooms or in other locations)
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as class action certification,8 8 settlements need not be filed with or approved
by courts; parties may simply agree to withdraw cases. These agreements are
contracts between litigants and are not filed in courts. No third party access
exists, save to the joint stipulation of dismissal.8 9 Further, in a few reported
cases, courts have also agreed to enter consent judgments that mandate
secrecy; confidentiality of settlement agreements, like vacatur, is justified as
a means of enabling settlements that might not otherwise occur. 9° Such
but do not specify who may attend. See, e.g., United States District Court, N.D. Cal.
Local Rule 500(5); United States District Court, W.D. Mich., Local Rule 43(h); United
States District Court, W.D. Okla., Local Rule 43(1).
In the winter of 1994, 1 requested information from the nine districts then
conducting voluntary court-annexed arbitration programs pursuant to these pro-
visions. Of the eight responses received, seven districts had held court-annexed
arbitration hearings. Clerks reported that in none of the seven do they keep
transcripts or records of such proceedings. Three clerks indicated that the
hearings were generally conducted in empty courtrooms; in a fourth district,
hearings occurred in the courthouse's offices, while three districts held hearings
outside the courthouse (including attorneys' offices). In terms of who could attend,
two districts reported that anyone could attend their hearings (most of which were
in courtrooms). Three districts indicated that attendance by third-parties was left
either up to the parties or the arbitrator. In the remaining two districts, no
information was available. 1994 Surveys of Federal District Courts with Voluntary
Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs (on file with the author).
A few opinions address public access to other forms of ADR. See, e.g., Cincinnati
Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988) (no First Amendment
right of access to summary jury trials); Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of
Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (1988) (discussing both FED. R. EVID. 408's
protection of settlement negotiations from admissibility into evidence and state
laws protecting mediation from disclosure; also warning lawyers about the pos-
sibility of being forced to disclose, in discovery, information obtained through
settlement negotiations).
88. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
89. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a). For discussion of this option, see Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986).
90. See, e.g., Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865-866 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing a
district judge who modified sealing orders, issued by a magistrate judge; such
unsealing could occur only upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances" or
"compelling need," a burden not met by New York, intervening in a civil anti-trust
action and seeking access to the settlement agreement); FDIC v. Ernst & Ernst, 677
F.2d 230, 231 (2d Cir. 1982) (settlement of litigation-about the failure of the Franklin
National Bank-that entailed confidentiality avoided "what promised to be a
lengthy trial"; also relying on the congressional decision not to include access to
court documents in the Freedom of Information Act as evidence that public policy
does not mandate disclosure in all cases). See also EEOC v. Strasurger, Price, Kelton,
Martin & Unis, 626 F.2d 1272, 1274 (5th Cir. 1980) (attorney fee challenge in sex
discrimination settlement that was sealed; the propriety of sealed settlements
assumed, not discussed).
In contrast, while recognizing that refusing confidentiality could discourage
settlements that might otherwise occur, some courts have objected to sealed settle-
ments. See, e.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992)
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settlements preclude third parties from obtaining information about litigation
and can impose costs on one-shotters, who may not know of the underlying
alleged malfeasance or, if knowledgeable, must undertake discovery to
document it anew. 9' Moreover, not only can repeat players condition
settlement on secrecy, they may also, under federal law, offer settlements in
lieu of the collection of attorneys' fees. 9
(vacating the sealing, pursuant to a settlement, of the record of summary judgment
motions in an explosion at an oil plant, even though that sealing was "an integral
part of a negotiated settlement . . . [that came] with the [trial] court's active
encouragement"); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust, 800 F.2d at 343-44 ("[a] settlement agreement
filed with the court is a public component of a civil trial," and thus the presumption
of a right of access to court documents applies). One Second Circuit case prohibits
litigants from filing one settlement agreement but having a side agreement with a
different set of terms. See Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1986).
Within the Sixth Circuit, courts have declined to be bound by settlement agreements
that mandate sealing and/or destruction of discovery. See United States v.
Kentucky Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 150-51 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (such agreements, claimed
necessary to promote the general interest in settlement, do not bind courts when
faced with motions for access to documents).
A few states have begun to impose obligations of access. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 69.081(3) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) ("no court shall enter an order or judgment
which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard . . ."); TEX. R. Civ. P.
76a(2)(b) (sealing court records) (providing not only a presumption of access to
documents filed with the court, but also a "presumption of openness" for "settlement
agreements not filed of record, excluding all reference to any monetary consid-
eration, that seek to restrict disclosure of information concerning matters that
have a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, or the
administration of public office, or the operation of government," as well as
discovery documents with similar contents).
91. See 1994 Secrecy Hearing, supra note 86, (testimony of Sybil Niden Goldrich, co-
founder of Command Trust Network, an organization that provides information to
women with breast implants, "the legal staffs of the manufacturers understood
their power. They fought using a strategy that required each person to reinvent
the wheel. They knew that an ailing woman could be coerced into unconscionable
settlements. They fought until the cost of litigation increased to such a level that
lawyers had to capitulate."); 1990 Secrecy Hearing, supra note 86, at 7-8 (testimony of
Frederick R. Barbee, discussing the death of his wife because of what he claimed to
be malfunction of the Bjork Shirley Convexo-Concave heart valve and how having
known about litigation on the valve's problems would have averted the injury). Cf.
Miller, supra note 84, at 484-85 (disputing that claim). See generally Brian T. FitzGerald,
Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System Going Secretly Private, 6 J. L. & POL. 381, 383 (1990)
(arguing against sealing).
92. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-743 (1986) (bargaining can include the
request that plaintiffs' attorneys waive their statutory rights to attorneys' fees
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988). A host
of other procedural options can assist settlement efforts. See, e.g., United States v.
Maryland Sand, Gravel and Stone Co., No. CIV.A.HAR 89-2869, 1993 WL 524777 (D.
Md. Nov. 30, 1993) (discussing United States' interest in adding another defendant
to affect "settlement discussions," and while "'impressed with the importance of
salutary settlements of controversies'," refusing to permit the belated amendment
HeinOnline -- 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1496 1993-1994
Whose Judgment? 1497
Fourth, in general, lawyers have an obligation to apprise courts of
information relevant to pending cases.93 Two federal circuits have relied on
this doctrine to impose a "duty" to inform judges of imminent or actual
settlements so as to avoid "unnecessary work." 94 Thus, the parties can delay
adjudication by informing courts of-potential settlements; repeat players can
use their bargaining power to avoid the issuance of opinions and thereby also
avoid third party access to legal rulings. Further, repeat players can pay losing
adversaries not to appeal, thereby keeping trial court decisions perceived to
be advantageous from being reviewed and possibly reversed. 95
b) Publication: The next side-step required is to understand the role
played by database services both in publishing court opinions in the first
instance and then in responding to orders of vacatur. The obvious questions
are what intervals exist between court issuance of an opinion and its
databasing, and what publishing services do, upon notification of vacatur on
consent, with the already published or databased cases. The two key
publishers in this arena are West Publishing Company, with its database
WESTLAW and its "Reporter Series," and LEXIS/NEXIS Services, which
includes that electronic service and is affiliated with Michie Publishing that
prints decisions from several state courts.
of the complaint) (quoting Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.2d 1436, 1437 (10th
Cir. 1993)).
93. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Board of License Commrs v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238, 240 (1985) (per curiam) (advising
that such duty should be discharged without delay).
94. Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1993); Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d
1276, 1280 (D.C.Cir. 1983). See also St. Charles Parish School Bd. v. GAF Corp., 512
So.2d 1165, 1173-74 (La. 1987). In the Seventh Circuit, while vacatur on consent is
generally not available (see In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1988)), the
duty to inform the court of settlement has sometimes provided grounds for vacatur
and sometimes not. See Gould, 11 F.3d at 84 (affirming a trial court's vacatur upon
learning of a settlement). Cf. Selcke v. New England Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 790, 791-92 (7th
Cir. 1993) (refusing to vacate a circuit opinion issued on the day the settlement
agreement was entered but before final payment had been made).
95. See Roger Parloff, Rigging the Common Law, AM. LAW., March, 1992, at 74
(describing efforts to keep opinions "on-or off-the books"; citing instance in which
an insurance carrier, "having won a ruling from a federal district judge . . .
dismissing a policyholder's case, may nevertheless pay the policy holder everything
it sued for-to keep the judge's ideas on the books and untested on appeal").
96. Thompson Publishing Company produces the Lawyers' Edition reporter for
Supreme Court decisions but does not have a companion on-line service. Those who
have the necessary electronic equipment may also access, directly, opinions on the
electronic "bulletin boards" (E-DOS) of the United States Supreme Court, nine of the
United States Courts of Appeals (the First through the Ninth) and some 70 percent
of the state courts; clerks' offices post such decisions upon issuance. Several United
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LEXIS and West Publishing report that they put United States Supreme
Court decisions on-line within an hour of release and that federal appellate
decisions are on-line within 24 hours. 97 Federal district court opinions,
many received within days or weeks of issuance, are "on-line within a
day."9" While all decisions that make it into print are placed on-line, not
States district courts have also begun experimenting with making their opinions
available on-line. Interview with Dan Wexler, of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (Court Systems Division) (June 2, 1994) [hereinafter "AO conversation"].
97. See, e.g., Letters from Donna M. Bergsgaard of West Publishing Company to
author (Dec. 3, 1993 & June 6, 1994) [hereinafter "West letters"]; Letter from Charles
J. Horn of LEXIS to author (Jan. 12, 1994) [hereinafter "LEXIS letter"]; Conversations
in June 1994 with Charles J. Horn of LEXIS/NEXIS Services (LEXIS Source Acquisition)
[hereinafter "LEXIS conversations"], and with Donna M. Bergsgaard of West
Publishing Company (Manager, Manuscript Department) [hereinafter "West
conversations"].
Turning to the question of selectivity among appellate decisions marked "for
publication," LEXIS reported that it puts "almost all of what" it receives from the
appellate courts on-line. However, some exclusions occur, by virtue of "guidelines"
about the "substantive nature of the decisions and the importance of the court."
For example, LEXIS generally does not put procedural orders (such as those granting
extensions of time to file) on line; grants of rehearing but not denials are generally
on-line. West Publishing indicated that its "lawyer-editors" review orders; that
many of these orders are "selected" for on-line publication, but that absent
"substantive legal reasoning," generally are excluded from print publication. West
letters, supra.
When opinions are labeled "not for publication," West reported that upon receipt
of such decisions, its "handling" varies, "depending upon what editorial decisions we
have made about making the material available and the local court rule which
governs publication." Id. West expressed a desire to promote public access to these
opinions and therefore places them on-line with a notation in the header that the
issuing court labeled an opinion "not for publication." LEXIS described a similar
procedure. With regards to the print publication of opinions labeled "not for
publication," West noted that they generally do not publish these materials in print,
although if published before designated "not for publication," such opinions will
most likely not be removed from the printed volumes. Id.
According to both publishers, they handle state court decisions at the supreme
and the appellate level in a manner similar to the federal appellate courts; those
states with electronic transmissions have their opinions data-based within a day of
transmission; mailed copies are on-line soon after receipt. The state trial opinions
offered on-line are those also published in print.
98. LEXIS letter, supra note 97; LEXIS and West conversations, supra note 97. See
also Publication Guide for Judges of the United States District Courts (West Aug.
1992); Publication Guide for United States Bankruptcy Judges (West Aug. 1992);
Publication Guide for United States Magistrate Judges (West Aug. 1992) [hereinafter,
Publication Guide/District, or Bankruptcy, or Magistrate Judge]. In all three
instances, judges send opinions to the publishers; when materials relate to procedure,
they are often reported in the Federal Rules of Decision. Id. at 2-3. However, West
provides more detail about its selection criteria to magistrate judges than to the
other judges. See Publication Guide/Magistrate Judge at 3 (explaining that selection
depends on decisions of "general interest and importance" and detailing categories).
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all decisions placed on-line are printed.99 When LEXIS is notified that a
decision has been vacated, the company "make[s] a notation in the
subsequent history of that document. "The text of the opinion is only
removed "if a court requests." In contrast, West stated that, depending upon
the court and the stage that the vacated opinion has reached in the
publication process, "we may either decide not to publish the original
opinion and publish the order vacating it, put the opinion and vacating order
on WESTLAW only, or utilize other procedures as deemed appropriate to
inform our customers in the most timely and effective manner." 1"
Putting together the publication practices of these publishers and the
settlement options available to repeat players, it becomes plain that, given
the many means by which repeat players can avoid dissemination of
information about litigation, vacatur on consent may-contrary to one's
intuitions-sometimes help, not hurt, third parties who could benefit from
the knowledge of a court's decision, even one that has been vacated. Once
courts engage in adjudication, that "formal act of government ' ' is
available to the public (unless West's lawyer-editors decide otherwise). If
timed so that an initial opinion has made it "on line," vacatur on consent
West also stated that it received cases from "over 600 courts and 3,600 judges,"
that each court sent decisions pursuant to their own local rules "regarding
publication," and that the time to databasing varied "by both court and internal
procedures." West letters, supra note 97. "Not every opinion that is received is put
on-line. Our Editorial Department reviews each decision as it arrives and makes a
determination of the treatment of the case." Id. The criteria for this determination
include whether the case had nationwide appeal or extensive press coverage, whether
the case involved novel issues of law, and/or involved some substantive legal
reasoning by the district judge, and whether the judge is well-known or well-read
within the legal specialty that the case presents. West conversations, supra note 97.
Further, "a recommendation by the authoring judge . .. is afforded considerable
weight." Publication Guides/all judges at 3.
99. Publication Guides/all judges, supra note 98, at 2-3.
100. West letter, supra note 97, at 4-5. If an opinion is kept, the fact of vacatur
will be noted on that opinion. The review policy is implemented by West "lawyer-
editors," who undertake a substantive analysis of the vacating order, and, if
necessary, contact the issuing court for "clarification" and "guidance." In terms
of its on-line database, West may either "physically withdraw" an opinion or add a
note about vacatur, either to the opinion or subsequent to the opinion.
Consideration is given to the court's requests on publication, if any. West
conversations, supra note 97, and letter of June 6, 1994. There is a strong presumption
towards providing public access to vacated opinions. Id.
101. These are Judge Ralph Winter's terms, from Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d
Cir. 1982) (discussing sealing of special litigation committee reports in shareholder
derivative actions and holding that, "absent exceptional circumstances," public
access must be provided). See also IBM Credit Corp. v. United Home for Aged Hebrews,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4372, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("once a decision has been filed and in
the public domain," it can have an influence, whether vacated or not).
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offers more for third parties than a relevant alternative-settlement in
advance of or at trial or before appeal.'02 If the availability of vacatur on
consent works to delay settlements until after judgment, that delay may
absorb the resources of both the immediate parties and the judiciary but may
also produce third-party benefits. Thus, the fact that Bonner Mall has been
a decision of the Ninth Circuit, binding on the lower courts since 1993,
might be seen as aiding other litigants who invoked that rule of law, whether
it remains "law" or not. Further, as discussed below, if vacated only because
of litigants' settlement, some judges may still perceive the decision to be
"law-like." 3
Of course the conclusion is not that vacatur on consent is necessarily
"good" for third parties. Rather, if one believes that an important purpose
of litigation is to generate information and law for the benefit of third parties
and the public in general, then objection should be made not only to the
practice of vacatur on consent but also to the host of other procedural
developments that promote settlement and other forms of alternative dispute
resolution less accessible to the public than is adjudication. If Judge
Finesilver's objection to repeat player power to control the shape of the law
is well-taken, procedural rules other than vacatur are also in need of revision.
Judicial and legislative promotion of settlement also diminish the
dissemination of information to third parties. Appellate court settlement
programs encourage litigants to drop appeals, thereby avoiding potential
precedent."°4 Delegation of factfinding and adjudication to low-visibility
judges in courts and agencies limits public information about disputes and
about state assessments of their validity.
But these procedural reforms, with little by way of third-party
information, have gained acceptance and are now so familiar as to make
objection passe. In contrast, vacatur on consent has drawn both judicial
attention and distress. Given the vitality of the debate about vacatur on
consent, one question is why that form of settlement has drawn so much
attention in contrast to other forms of repeat player advantages, many of
102. See also Oklahoma Radio Assoc's. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986)) ("'We are not sure
what [the] request [for vacatur of an appellate court opinion, as contrasted with
vacatur of a judgment] means in practical effect. The opinions have been published
in bound volumes of the Federal Reporter, Second Series, and no action by this or any other
Court can change that fact retroactively."'). Because vacatur on consent does
provide such a vehicle for dissemination of information, its existence may point to
bargaining errors by those repeat players who could have avoided the adjudication
altogether.
103. See infra Section III.C, The Consequences of Vacatur, below.
104. See discussion of such programs, infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
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which involve incentives for settlement. Another issue is whether courts and
legislatures should rethink their other procedural innovations and either
mandate public access and/or record keeping to enable dissemination of
information about these activities and the agreements generated or rethink
the desirability of such programs.
The hallmark of vacatur on consent is that a judge or jury has spoken.
Is the bargaining that occurs once adjudication has occurred different from
other forms of bargaining? Should the fact that judges and/or juries have
spoken be preserved, whatever bargains are struck? To respond, several
additional issues need to be parsed. Below, I first examine the consequences
of vacatur on consent, to gain some sense of what parties hope for and then
obtain-in fact and in law-by vacatur on consent. Thereafter, I consider
other instances when settlements between litigants engender court action,
including the alteration of previously-entered judgments. The questions are
a) whether vacatur upon settlement is substantially different from other
instances in which courts withdraw and amend opinions or accede to parties'
requests for the entry of judgment as part of consent decrees and b) whether
vacatur on consent might more readily be integrated into the practices of trial
courts but not permitted appellate courts, including the United States
Supreme Court.
C. The Consequences of Vacatur: Judicial Roles in Promoting Settlement
and the Sanctity of Court Judgments
My initial exploration of litigant autonomy was premised on two
immediate kinds of gains from vacatur on consent: monetary gains and the
avoidance of an enduring adjudication. But litigants can obtain some aspects
of both-money and avoidance of subsequent court decisions-without
requesting vacatur. Because settlements after trial are neither novel nor
idiosyncratic events, 05 the appropriate baseline assumption is that parties
105. Several empirical studies document that practice. See, e.g., MICHAEL G.
SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, POST-TRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS 47 (RAND, ICJ
1987) (post-trial, jury verdicts were modified in about 20 percent of the cases, overall,
and in 25 percent of the cases in which plaintiffs prevailed at trial); U.S. General
Accounting Office, Product Liability: Verdicts and Case Resolution in Five States (GAO: HRD
89-99, Sept. 1989) at 39-40 (post-trial settlements sometimes increase the amount
awarded to the plaintiff but more often decrease it); Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics of
Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 11 JuST. SYS. J. 349 (1986) (plaintiffs
received original jury award in 25 percent of the cases); Brian Ostrom, Roger
Hanson, and Henry Daley, So the Verdict is In-What Happens Next? The Continuing Story of Tort
Awards in the State Courts, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 97, 101-102 (1993) (tracking post-trial activity
in 416 plaintiff verdicts in state court tort trials, and finding 16 percent involving
1501
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have the power to negotiate after trial. Further, parties can settle in a
manner that is faster and cheaper-by bilateral negotiation culminating in a
modification of a court order, agreed-upon departures from that order, or a
request to dismiss a pending appeal-than by spending lawyer time
petitioning (let alone having to justify to) a court to authorize vacatur. Note
also that settlement options occur all along the way to the appellate courts,
from the pre-trial to post-verdict stages, then upon the filing of a notice of
appeal, up until and after argument of such appeals, 1"6 the filing of petitions
for rehearing, certiorari, argument, decision, and petition for rehearing in the
United States Supreme Court.'17
Dismissal of pending requests for additional court action is the parties'
prerogative. Indeed, "civil appeals management programs" have sprung up
around the federal circuits as evidence not only of the ability of parties to
dismiss pending appeals but of appellate courts' interest in assisting parties in
this effort."l0 Promulgated amendments to the federal appellate rules"
post-trial renegotiation and another 16 percent resulting in notices of appeal);
Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with
Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992) (reviewing verdicts over a 25-year period, relying
on attorney survey data and court records, and detailing substantial post-verdict
negotiation as well as adjudicatory activity).
106. See SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 105, at xi (in a sample of 880 cases tried in
two jurisdictions-Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco, California-of the 20
percent of the jury verdicts modified post-trial, the most common method-62 percent
of the cases-of modification was the negotiation of a smaller payment). While
Shanley and Peterson did not explore what animated post-trial negotiation, they did
learn, from the lawyers surveyed, that in 13 percent of the cases, plaintiffs agreed
to a lesser amount because of concerns about collection-that defendants had
insufficient insurance and could not pay the full amount. Id. at xi. They also
learned that when punitive damages were awarded (which was infrequent), post-trial
activity was likely to reduce them. Id. at 36-37.
107. Administrative adjudication and court review offer yet other iterations.
See Reich v. Contractors Welding, 996 F.2d 1409 (2d Cir. 1993).
108. The 1967 version of FED. R. APP. P. 33 permitted an appellate court to order
"a prehearing conference to consider the simplification of the issues and such other
matters as may aid in the disposition of the proceeding by the court." In 1974, the
Second Circuit established an appellate settlement process, called the "Civil Appeals
Management Plan" ("CAMP"). See Irving R. Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the
Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Program, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 758-61 (1986) (the
encouragement of settlement is an important aspect of the program; data indicated
that CAMP "reduce[d] by one-sixth the number of cases argued"); see also Irving R.
Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) ("CAMP settles more cases than two judges would
normally handle in a year at one-third the cost of two judicial chambers.").
As of 1993, seven circuits (the District of Columbia Circuit, the First, Second,
Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh) had active. programs, some of which stressed
settlement more than others. Telephone interview with staff at the Court
Administration Division, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Nov. 2, 1993). Out
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go further and authorize appellate courts to require participation in such
settlement conferences. State courts have parallel appellate settlement
programs.
110
Thus, other aspects of the problem are more clearly framed: Given that
litigants can settle more cheaply and quickly without asking the court for
vacatur and (if settling while an appeal is pending) can avoid the binding
power of an appellate decision by dismissal, what do litigants seek that
prompts them to settle more slowly and expensively by including in a
settlement the requirement for court action? Further, should judicial efforts
to encourage settlement change as cases move along the litigation spectrum,
from the pre-trial process, through trial, and then on appeal? Are rules on
vacatur on consent (and on other settlement and ADR efforts) appropriate for
the trial court but inappropriate for the appellate courts? The Supreme
Court?
Answering these questions would be made easier by empirical work that
illuminates more than what briefs and reported opinions have to tell about
what bargains were struck and why, and about what happened, after courts
of one such conference in the Second Circuit came a settlement that, with staff
assistance, included the vacatur of a trial court opinion. See Nestle Co. v.
Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985) and discussion of it in Manufacturer's
Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384 (1993).
109. On September 20, 1993, the Judicial Conference of the United States approved,
and on April 29, 1994, the United States Supreme Court promulgated an amendment
to Rule 33 that permits an appellate court to:
direct the attorneys, and in the appropriate cases the parties, to participate
in one or more conferences to address any matter that may aid in the
disposition of the proceedings, including the simplification of the issues and
the possibility of settlement .... As a result of a conference, the court may
enter an order ... implementing any settlement agreement.
FED. R. APP. P. 33 (1994) (effective Dec. 1, 1994 absent congressional action). The
Advisory Note does not discuss whether the mandate to appellate courts to
"implemento any settlement agreement" contemplates that such orders could include
vacatur on consent. See Advisory Note, in Communications from the Chief Justice,
the Supreme Court of the United States (transmitting amendments to the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure as Adopted by the Court, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1994)) at 68-69, H. R. Doc. No. 103-247, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
110. As the majority reported in Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119,
121 (Cal. 1992), as of 1985, one half of the California appellate courts had no formal
or informal settlement programs; by 1992, every court had such programs. See also
Sheila Sonenshine, Real Lawyers Settle: A Successful Post-Trial Settlement Program in the California
Court of Appeal, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (1993) (Associate Justice Sonenshine
describing the increasing use of a mandatory program, through which 95 percent of
the civil cases went and by which some 40 percent of those cases settled). For
discussion of the "success" of Mississippi's Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
of that state, see Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Appellate Settlement Conference Programs: A Case Study,
1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 57, 106-07.
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either granted or denied vacatur. To my knowledge, no such empirical work
exists."' Instead, I piece together from available information some of what
we can assume parties seek in vacatur-to enable assessment of what courts
have and should give.
1. Ambiguity and Comfort
According to one of the briefs in Neary, the defendant veterinarians
took offense at the finding that they had libeled Mr. Neary. They wanted
"peace of mind" and "look[ed] upon the judgment in this case as a
conviction, as a finding of guilt .. ."' Presumably then, they also looked
upon the stipulated vacatur or reversal as vindication that the "finding of
guilt" no longer stood. On the other hand, we also know that at least at one
point, Mr. Neary was not "at peace" with the agreement to vacate. He wrote
a letter to the court"3 in which he stated that
to reverse the decision would be an outrage to me and other victims and an
affront to the jury system.... Personally, they [the defendants] should be
publicly horsewhipped and driven from the company of honest men and
especially teachers."'
What one hears from both sides of Neary are the voices of unhappy litigants,
appellant veterinarians hating the results of the trial and appellee rancher
liking those results. Yet, at some later point, Mr. Neary was persuaded (by
whom?) to accept $3 million and the vacatur-perhaps with the view that the
111. To my knowledge, one empirical study of vacatur exists: Professor Stephen
Barnett sampled one fifth of the minutes from California intermediate appellate
courts during a five year period. He found records of the appellate court dismissing
appeals based on parties' stipulations and concluded that, on average, some 240
cases settled while an appeal was pending during each of the years studied. Because
the parties to the Neary appeal identified twelve instances of stipulated reversal or
vacatur, he estimated that in about one percent of the cases settling while an
appeal was pending, parties sought to have an appellate court do something other
than dismiss. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear, supra note 26, at 1070 & nn.205, 294.
A second study, now underway, of lawyers' appellate settlement practice may shed
light on vacatur. Letter from Professor Geoffrey P. Miller about his and attorney
Tom Meites's research (Nov. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
112. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Court of Appeal's Decision at 3,
Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992) (No. S020515) (on file with
author). As described by Justice Kline, the parties claimed that "[u]nless the
judgment is vacated, the veterinarians will not have achieved the peace they
bargained for when they signed their settlement agreement." Neary v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 773, 775 (Ct. App. 1991).
113. As he put it, he was "reluctant to burden [his] counselors with this matter."
Letter from George Neary to Justice Kline (Feb. 8, 1991) (on file with the author).
114. Id.
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vacatur was not the equivalent of an appellate court declaring the finding
below null and void.
These litigants' conflicting desires demonstrate the possible utility of
vacatur as a source of ambiguity. Vacating a decision at the parties' behest
does not negate the earlier outcome entirely. Juries and judges have still
ruled, and appellate courts have not announced any legal error. Out of an
amalgam of technicality and ambiguity, perhaps both sides can find the
comfort they seek, comfort that would be unavailable were an appellate court
to find for either one of them. In short, Neary may illustrate instances in
which litigants bargain for-and appellate courts give-confusion, and with
that confusion, emotional solace. Perhaps both sets of lawyers persuaded
their clients that vacatur vindicated each side's position.
If vacatur on consent is understood as providing litigants with more
options than the dichotomous alternatives of winning and losing, vacatur
becomes responsive to the criticism of courts as offering too limited an array
of remedies. Vacatur on consent can thus be seen as a form of alternative
dispute resolution, augmenting courts' remedies and enhancing their
flexibility.
2. Implicit and Inexpensive Reversals on the Merits
But if vacatur on consent becomes commonplace, will its status as an
ambiguous, and therefore comforting, act be sustained? What exactly do
parties request, by their motion for vacatur, and what exactly do courts do,
when they vacate predicated on a settlement? One easy assumption is that
vacatur on consent, like any other form of vacatur, nullifies the earlier
opinion. But both argument about vacatur and the case law that flows from
it undermine the confidence with which one can describe the actual effects
of this form of vacatur.
The briefs and opinions in Neary evidence some confusion about the
meaning and import of vacatur on consent, or even what to call it. The
Neary litigants wanted something that they alternately described as "reversal"
and "vacatur," but as they explained in briefs before the Supreme Court of
California, they were not seeking a decision "on the merits."' 15 The justices,
115. See the intermediate appellate opinion, Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278
Cal. Rptr. 773, 774 (Ct. App. 1991) ("joint application for stipulated reversal . . .").
Thereafter, the litigants argued to the California Supreme Court that vacatur was
sought instead. See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 1, n.1, Neary, 834 P.2d 119 (No.
S020515) (on file with the author) ("The parties asked the Court of Appeal for 're-
versal,' rather than vacatur, only because they were concerned that vacating a
judgment might not be a permissible remedy under California law .... Because Appel-
1505
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in turn, debated the legal import of what they did as well. The majority
denied that vacatur on consent was ambiguous.
There will be no inference that the jury or trial court erred. Whatever
conclusions the public wishes to draw from this litigation can still be drawn
after the reversal. To remove any possible doubt in a case of stipulated
reversal, the appellate court can explicitly state in its order that the reversal
is pursuant to settlement and does not constitute either approval or rejection
of the trial court's judgment." 6
Justice Kennard, in dissent, disagreed.
The parties assert that reversal is necessary because the defendant veterinarians
insist upon it to protect their professional reputations. At the same time, they
assert (and the majority agrees) that a stipulated reversal would not imply that
the judgment is defective on the merits .... The parties may not have it
both ways."I
In contrast to the position that vacatur on consent does not undermine
the decision below, in both Kaisha and Bonner Mall, litigants and the United
States government (as amicus) argued to the United States Supreme Court
that, when parties request vacatur, they are communicating to the appellate
court that the "parties are not willing to be bound by the district court's
judgment, but have instead reached their own, often quite different,
resolution of their dispute." ' l As a consequence, "the validity of an
unreviewed district court decision that has been compromised on appeal is
open to question.'" 9  The thesis is that the compromise "from the
combined perspective of the parties, is more just than the judgment they seek
to have vacated."' 20
This approach suggests that vacatur on consent furthers not only the
parties' interests-in controlling the import of their dispute-but also the
public's interest; weak judgments can be voided without the costs of a full
lants are not asking for a decision on the merits, we shall use 'vacatur,' rather
than 'reversal,' throughout this [California Supreme Court] brief.").
116. Neary, 834 P.2d at 124. See also Norman I. Krug Real Estate Invs., Inc. v.
Praszker, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1814, 1825 (1994) (a post-Neary case, vacating a judgment in
part, and stating that "[s]aid reversal does not represent a considered rejection by
this court of the judgment below.").
117. Id. at 132.
118. U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha, supra note 53, at 27 (emphasis in the original). Philips
Merits Brief, Kaisha, supra note 53, at 5 (explanation of the errors in the district court
opinion); U.S. Amicus Brief, Bonner Mall, supra note 45, at 5; U.S. Bancorp Merits Brief,
supra note 46, at 12-13.
119. U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha, supra note 53, at 33.
120. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
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appeal. Vacatur is a short cut for either a trial or an appellate court, which
can rely on parties' suspicions and dealmaking about trial verdicts or appellate
decisions to eliminate them. If this position prevails, then permitting vacatur
on consent can be seen not only to vindicate parties' feelings (see Neary), but
also their legal and moral judgments-about the validity and justice of the
trial verdicts themselves. Vacatur lets litigants undo district court
decisionmaking without having to bear the economic burdens-or the
risks-of an appeal.' Appellate courts that authorize this practice may
thus have devised not only an economical mode for the litigants (not
"forced" to pursue an unwanted appeal), but also a method to have cheap
appeals that destroy lower court opinions without taking much appellate
court time. This savings can accrue to the appellate courts if motions for
reargument are pending and to the United States Supreme Court if certiorari
is pending or has been granted and the case settles.'22
3. Subsequent Uses and Uncertain Preclusive Effects
Litigants in Kaisha have claimed that vacatur on settlement "erases" the
lower court opinion, which then has neither legal nor factual weight.'
That view is predicated on the general rule that "a judgment that has been
vacated, reversed, or set aside on appeal [or by the trial court] is thereby
deprived of all conclusive effect, both as res judicata and as collateral
estoppel." 124 Note that this statement of the black letter rule folds together
vacatur, reversal, and set-asides; it makes no mention of the various reasons
for vacatur, and specifically of the phenomenon of vacatur by consent.2 5
Turning from the general rule to the specifics, the black letter rule is a
fair statement of the law, but only sometimes. In some circuits, vacated
opinions cannot be used for collateral estoppel, at least if the parties so
stipulate.'26 But in other circuits, parties can obtain vacatur on consent,
121. In contrast, when an appeal is "dismissed," the lower court decision stands.
122. In Bonner Mall, the argument made is that even without an agreement on
vacatur, the settlement evidences the fact that the party which prevailed below is
not willing to risk reversal. U.S. Amicus Brief, Bonner Mall, supra note 45, at 5.
123. TLPJ's Amicus Brief, Kaisha, supra note 7, at 5-7.
124. MOORE, ET AL, supra note 56, at 0.416[2].
125. The treatise writers do discuss the phenomenon. See supra note 56.
126. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138,
1146 (2d Cir. 1992), affd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993) (holding that it was "an
abuse of discretion for a district court to refuse to enter a vacatur pursuant to
a settlement providing that the vacated order would not have collateral estoppel
effect in any subsequent action.") (citing Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d
280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Long Island Lighting Co v. Cuomo, 888 F.2d 230, 234 (2d
1507Whose Judgment?
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yet nevertheless, face that vacated opinion, used as collateral estoppel in a
subsequent case. Both the Ninth Circuit17 and the Fifth Circuit 28 have
Cir. 1989) (citing 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10 (2d ed. 1984), discussing the need for parties
to be able to bargain about the "future protection" they desire from judgments). The
Second Circuit rule may then rely on what the parties bargained for; if the
settlement does not specify the potential collateral estoppel use of the judgment,
then it may be possible-even in the Second Circuit-to use it. See, e.g., Connelly
Containers, Inc. v. Bernard, 717 F. Supp. 202, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The parties' intention
determines the collateral estoppel effect of a consent judgment.").
127. See Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1991). At a first trial (Amos
v. Union Oil Co., 663 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Or. 1987)), dealers sued Unocal, charged that
its "sudden switch" to a lower octane fuel constituted, inter alia, tortious breach
of contract, and a jury found Unocal liable. 944 F.2d. at 648-49. While an appeal
was pending, the parties settled, conditioned on vacating the judgment. On remand,
the trial judge, Owen Panner, did so. Id. at 649. Thereafter, other Unocal dealers
sued-in the Bates case-and Judge Panner once again presided. Using the Amos initial
holding as preclusive, Judge Panner explained that his "order of vacatur says
nothing about the preclusive effect of the Amos judgment, nor does it indicate my
opinion on it. I vacated the Amos judgment so that the parties would settle the
case." Id. In addition to resolving liability against Unocal, Judge Panner also relied
on the vacated opinion to assess $120,000 in punitive damages; the jury thereafter
found compensatory damages for each of the dealer plaintiffs. Id.
128. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1188-92 & n.83 (5th
Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983). Chemetron is a part of extensive litigation
involving Western Equities, Inc. (Westec), and its' "stock scandal." Id. at 1154. In
1974, a trial judge heard one aspect, about whether a participant named David
Bintliff had unlawfully manipulated the value of Westec's stock. Cosmos Bank v.
Bintliff, Civ. Action No. 67-H-590 (S.D. Tex. 1975). That court found against Bintliff
but subsequently withdrew its opinion because of settlement. Chemetron, 682 F.2d at
1188 n.83.
Chemetron had also begun litigation, in 1967, against 57 defendants whom it
claimed had violated federal and state securities laws. In its pre-trial motions
before a 1979 trial, Chemetron had sought to have Bintliff collaterally estopped
from relitigating certain facts found against him in the Cosmos Bank case. The trial
judge refused to do so. Id. at 1187. Chemetron prevailed before the jury on its claims
under Section 10(b)5 of the 1934 Act but lost on the Section 9 claims. Id. at 1155.
Bintliff was again found liable. Id.
In its "cautionary cross-appeal," id., Chemetron raised the collateral estoppel
issue. Its caution proved apt, because the Fifth Circuit held that Section 10(b)
liability was not available and ordered a retrial in which it authorized collateral
estoppel use of facts found against Bintliff in the Cosmos Bank litigation. Id. at 1194.
The Fifth Circuit in Chemetron applied federal preclusion rules and used the criteria
of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) to determine that it would not
be "unfair" to use the earlier decision, withdrawn and set aside because of the
parties' settlement, as collateral estoppel. 682 F.2d at 1191.
Thereafter, Bintliff's petition for review of the holding on the availability of
collateral estoppel was denied. See Bintliff v. Chemetron Corp., 51 U.S.L.W. 3641 (U.S.
Mar. 1, 1983); Bintliff v. Chemetron Corp., 460 U.S. 1013 (1983). Certiorari was
granted on Chemetron's question of 10(b)-5 liability, and then the decision was
vacated in light of another ruling on the relationship among liabilities under the
1934 Act. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 51 U.S.L.W. 3520 (U.S. Jan. 11,
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on occasion permitted subsequent reliance on district court opinions vacated
pursuant to settlement. Further, the Ninth Circuit's "rule" on vacatur is that
the question of the subsequent use of a decision is to be decided in each case,
as courts weigh the "equities and hardships... between the competing values
of right to relitigate and finality of judgment."129
In other words, "vacated" may not be "vacated"-in the sense that
opinions "vacated on consent" have actually been used, despite the vacatur,
as precedent, as persuasive reasoning, and as collateral estoppel. 3° To be
sure, the instances in which vacated opinions are used expressly as collateral
estoppel are not frequent in the reported literature.'3 ' Some of these cases
may be explained by sloppy lawyering; when parties neglect to set forth-as
an express term and condition of their settlements-that they intend no
further use of the opinion, that failure has, upon occasion, come back to
1983); Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), vacated in light of
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). On remand the Fifth Circuit
concluded that 10(b)-5 liability was available and reinstated that award of damages
to Chemetron. Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 718 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir.
1983).
Because the Fifth Circuit's decision in Chemetron about collateral estoppel was
itself vacated on the merits, one subsequent Fifth Circuit case concluded that it has
"no precedential force." Hughes v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 847 F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir.
1988). But see Jolley v. Welch, 904 F.2d 988, 993 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1050 (1991) (invoking Chemetron on securities law, noting Hughes, and commenting that
the relevant aspects of the opinion were not at issue in the vacatur on the merits
ruling by the Supreme Court). Other courts have invoked the Chemetron ruling on the
availability of collateral estoppel. See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 561 (4th
Cir. 1987).
129. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720,
722 (9th Cir. 1982) (calling for district court exploration of the "consequences and
attendant hardships of dismissal or refusal to dismiss" as they relate to the
particular case, its facts, and the parties' motives for vacatur). See also National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no abuse
of discretion when district court declined to vacate partial judgment entered
against the insurer); Continental Casualty Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 4 F.3d 777, 779-80
(9th Cir. 1993) (relationship between moomess stemming from the acts of one party
and vacatur; remanded to trial court to apply Ringsby rule). The Tenth Circuit has
recently framed a similar rule about vacating its own opinions. See Oklahoma Radio
Assoc. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1444 (10th Cir. 1993) (court to determine "whether
vacatur of an opinion of the court is appropriate on the basis of the particular
circumstances if such a request is made").
130. One form of recycling, use of trial court opinions as persuasive and/or
precedential authority as distinguished from preclusion is advocated by WRIGHT,
MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 56, at § 3533.10.
131. An unanswered question (pending empirical work) is how these vacated
decisions function in the world of bargaining and of unreported adjudication.
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haunt them: the "Vacated Opinion Returns."'32  Ambivalent judging is
also evident; judges have relied on vacated opinions when faced with a
litigant as an alleged violator of yet another party's rights. A judge who
initially consented to vacatur appears to have second thoughts about the
impact of the first acquiescence. The theoretical possibility of repetition of
illegal behavior turns into factual claims that it is happening again, that the
very same people who benefitted from an earlier vacatur are denying anew
their obligations. The talismanic "capable of repetition yet evading review"
prompts a judge to put an end to the evasion by using the fact of repetition
to rely on the prior vacated decision.
33
But even when vacatur is granted and preclusion officially destroyed,
court opinions may be (in Judge Easterbrook's metaphor) under "clouds," but
they have not "vanish[ed].' 1 34 Not only is the public free, as the Neary
court recognized, to draw what conclusions it likes from records, neither
"destroyed Inlor sealed,' 1 35 but judges both proclaim the availability of such
use when vacating decisions136 and also rely on vacated opinions when
rendering subsequent decisions. As one judge, following an opinion of
another who had ruled some seven years earlier and then vacated the opinion
132. See, e.g., Bates, 944 F.2d at 649. See also In re Otasco, Inc., 18 F.3d 841 (10th Cir.
1994) (dismissal of claims without vacatur of order, even if order should have been
vacated, does not preclude that order's use as collateral estoppel); cf. Harris Trust
& Say. Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138, 1146 (2d Cir. 1992)
(preclusion denied because parties had stipulated to the entry of an order that "the
findings and conclusions embodied therein, is withdrawn, set aside and vacated, and
shall be of no force or effect for use against defendant, its successors and assigns,
by plaintiffs, by the Pension Fund or by third parties, for collateral estoppel or other
preclusive purposes").
133. These cases may be a form of what a few courts have called "judicial
estoppel"-which "prevents a party who benefits from the assertion of a certain
position from subsequently adopting a contrary position in any other litigation."
David v. ShowtimelThe Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See
generally MOORE, LUcAS, & CURRIER, supra note 56, at 0.405[8] (the doctrine, which is in
some tension with liberal rules of pleading that permit alternative theories, exists
but is deployed "cautiously"). The estoppel is explained as preventing "unfairness" to
opponents and protecting the "integrity of the judicial process." David, 697 F. Supp.
at 763.
134. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
135. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 124 (Cal. 1992).
136. See, e.g., IBM Credit Corp. v. United Home for Aged Hebrews, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4372, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Once a decision has been filed and in the public
domain, its influence" is based on its merit, "whether vacated in connection with a
settlement or not so vacated.") See also Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1993)
(significance of district court opinion, which is not precedent, remains upon vacatur
for "supervening mootness" or other grounds; that "information" has whatever
value people take from it).
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on consent, explained his reliance: that "decision . . .has since been
depublished but remains sound guiding analysis ... ."137
Vacatur generates more than confusion and quasi-law; it has upon
occasion also prompted rebellion. District court judges have been in open
controversy with their appellate siblings over the practice. The opinion of
Judge Finesilver in Benavides v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company
demonstrates the import that he accords trial court adjudication. 3 ' After
explaining why he had issued a legal ruling finding an insurance company's
refusal to pay on a policy contestable, which was then followed by settlement
and a brief appellate order instructing vacatur of the judgment, the trial judge
wrote a lengthy rebuttal, concluding:
Vacatur allows wealthy litigants to become, in effect, editors of their own
treatises on the subjects which concern them. We have no kind words for
such a practice .... Accordingly, we must respectfully decline to vacate our
prior judgment pending a reasoned and more detailed order from the Court of
Appeals.
139
Thus, parties do not always get that for which they thought they had
bargained; at least upon occasion, judges openly (let alone covertly) rely on
decisions that have been vacated by settlement. To the extent the events
occurred, they cannot be redacted, no matter what the text of a court order.
To the extent the decision is (such as Bonner Mall) the "law" of a circuit, that
ruling will be invoked and relied upon by trial courts until, and sometimes
even after, it is vacated. When repeat players appear in other courts or the
legal issue reemerges, the events and the case law that sprouted in their wake
have ways of being remembered.'O
137. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1192 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (relying on Judge Lasker's vacated opinion in Bankers Trust Co. v.
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 621 F. Supp. 685
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also In re Scottsdale Medical Pavilion, 159 B.R. 295, 299 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1993) ("The Tucson Industrial case, though vacated, properly noted ...."); In re
Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Meyerson & Casey, 160 B.R. 882,
898 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("a logical and well-reasoned decision, despite vacatur, is
always persuasive authority"). See discussion supra note 103.
138. 820 F. Supp. 1284, 1286-89 (D. Colo. 1993).
139. Id. at 1289. As of the spring of 1994, no further opinions had issued.
Conversation with Judge Finesilver's chambers Uune, 1994). See also Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Prince George's Country, No.
CIV.A.HAR88-618, 1993 WL 524783, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 22, 1993) ("with all due respect,"
declining to follow Fourth Circuit order to vacate).
140. Disparity of resources may have particular relevance in this context. Given
transaction costs, one-shot future litigants may be less likely to uncover the past,
vacated behavior, whereas repeat-playing opponents may have better access to such
information.
Whose Judgment? 1511
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One might fashion an argument against vacatur on settlement from a
pragmatic stance developed out of this history and description: that courts
should not offer vacatur on settlement because it is an intrinsically ambiguous
act. While vacatur may, by its ambiguity, provide both comfort and implicit
reversals, its absence of a base-in either law or fact-undercuts its efficacy.
In future exchanges, lawyers, litigants, judges, and witnesses will find ways to
retell the stories of the past findings of illegality. When everyone knows it
was only smoke and mirrors (in this context, often the exchange of money)
that brought about the vacatur of a decision, people will peek behind the
mirror.
The persuasiveness of this pragmatic critique turns, in part, on the
relationship between the ambiguity engendered by vacatur on consent and
other actions of courts, some of which also alter prior adjudication and entail
ambiguity. It is to those analogous practices, hardly mentioned in the vacatur
case law, that I now turn.
4. Analogies: Consent Decrees, Expunction of Convictions, and
Depublication
One view of vacatur by consent is that it is an aberrant judicial act,
somehow different from what courts ordinarily do. To put it baldly, critics
claim that vacatur on consent is a kind of legal lie (the polite term is a "legal
fiction").' 4 ' The fictive status, in turn, diminishes the force of court action
and undermines the idea of courts as institutions that predicate action upon
deliberation. But ambiguity is not found only in vacatur produced by
settlement, and other court actions do not always entail deliberation. There
are parallels in what courts already "do" that might provide precedents for
vacatur on consent.
42
A first example is the practice, common at the trial court level, of
entering consent judgments. According to Justice Brennan, consent
judgments are a mixed phenomenon:
To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of judgments entered
after litigation. At the same time, because their terms are arrived at through
mutual agreement of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble
141. Some courts call it a "factual fiction." United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d
952, 960 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
142. Murray L. Schwartz, The Other Things That Courts Do, 28 UCLA L. REV. 438, 459-62
(1981) (detailing and analyzing the many activities of courts that are not
adjudication-focused, including rule promulgation, appointment of officers, and
probate administration).
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contracts .... More accurately, then,... consent decrees "have attributes
both of contracts and of judicial decrees," a dual character that has resulted in
different treatment for different purposes.'43
While there is dispute about the nature and import of consent judgments,
their availability has long been assumed' 4 and parties' power to craft them
widely celebrated. 1
45
Under the "law" of consent decrees, courts have the "duty" to enter
judgment at parties' behest, 146 with "no power to supplement or construe
the agreement.' 47  Further, sometimes parties consent to judgment after
a good deal of litigation has taken place, and (as a part of the bargain)
withdraw claims or deny liability already found by trial judges. As a part of
consent judgments, parties can bargain over the future use of those decrees.
Their bargains can prevent subsequent deployment of decisions rendered by
judges or juries,' and parties' bargains can authorize preclusion.
49
143. Local 93, Int'l. Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519
(1986) (quoting United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37
(1975)).
144. For a more critical appraisal, see Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 43 [hereinafter Resnik, Judging Consent].
145. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 770 (1992) ("[A]
consent decree reflects the parties' understanding of the best remedy, and, subject
to judicial approval, the parties to a consent decree enjoy at least as broad
discretion as the District Court in formulating the remedial decree.").
146. See HENRY BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 12-15 (1891); see also A.C.
FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1350 (5th ed. 1925).
147. FREEMAN, supra note 146, at 2771.
148. Hughes v. Sante Fe Int'l Corp., 847 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1988), discussed supra note
128, involved a jury verdict followed by a settlement modifying the verdict. Douglas
Hughes sued Brown and Root for negligence for injuries incurred while working on
a company barge. After a jury had awarded $17,900 in damages, but before entry of
judgment, Hughes filed a second action, based on strict liability, again against
Brown and Root as well as against a prior owner of the barge, Santa Fe
International Corp., and the barge's builder. Hughes sought a retrial in the first
case; thereafter, Hughes settled with Brown and Root, which paid him a total of
$410,000. The trial court entered a final judgment, in which it stated that the jury
had awarded Hughes $17,000, that as part of the settlement agreement, he received
additional sums, and that he agreed to dismiss Brown and Root from the second
case but preserved his litigation against other defendants. In the second case, a
trial court granted Santa Fe's summary judgment based on collateral estoppel of
issues allegedly decided in the first action. The Fifth Circuit reversed, because the
parties' consent judgment-and not the jury's findings-concluded the first action,
and a consent judgment could not be used as collateral estoppel.
149. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 120 B.R. 396, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) ("only where the
parties manifest an intention to give preclusive effect to the consent judgment by
including detailed recitations of findings upon which the judgment is based, is issue
preclusion appropriate"); see also Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1472 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("mhat a judgment is entered by stipulation does not in and of itself remove the
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Consent judgments at trial therefore offer a parallel to vacatur, both because
courts act at the parties' behest, because these consent decrees can include
parties' decisions on the use of prior adjudications, and because there is some
ambiguity about the effects of consent judgments, as evidenced in a raft of
post-consent litigation in a variety of substantive areas.150
The model of consent judgments is a powerful precedent that responds,
descriptively, to one of the normative claims made against vacatur on
consent. The proposition is that, while parties may be free to bargain among
themselves, they are less free to bargain when their bargains depend on court
action, because courts serve the public as well as the parties."' Consent
decrees document, however, that courts do act "at the behest of the parties,"
and both enter judgments written by those parties and enforce them.
Further, within those consent judgments, parties sometimes stipulate to the
meaning and permissible use of previous adjudication by judges and juries.
Moreover, consent decrees suggest that, despite parties' agreement to
discontinue litigation, a "case" or "controversy" exists, enabling courts to
have the authority to enter judgment. 152  A claim might have been
effect of a court's prior determination of specific issues in the litigation. A
stipulated or consent judgment, like a contract, must be construed to determine its
effect in light of all of the circumstances.") (emphasis in the original). The court
then concluded that a prior decision on the invalidity of a patent was preclusive.
150. 'The decision about whether to permit a consent judgment is not completely
in the hands of the litigants. Prior to entering a consent judgment, a trial court
must ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction, that the judgment comes within
the scope of the pleading, that it "further[s] the objectives of the law," and that the
proposed agreement does not conflict with legal norms. Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525-26 (1986). Further, by consent
agreements, parties can contract to do more than the law requires. Id.; see also Rufo
v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 760-61 (1992) (discussing standard
for modification of consent decrees; under a more "flexible" standard in
institutional reform litigation, the fact that the law no longer requires a
particular outcome does not, in itself, mandate revision of a consent decree).
If vacatur on consent is analogized to consent judgments, one might attempt to
import these rules; vacatur on consent could be permitted only after court scrutiny
to ensure compliance with legal norms. The question is, however, whether vacating
of judgment for settlement is a violation of legal norms.
151. See, e.g., In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988).
152. See, e.g., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White and Chief Justice Burger,
dissented from a summary affirmance of the challenge to the trial court's decision
on whether the settlement in the AT&T antitrust litigation was in the "public
interest," a determination mandated by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1988). Justice
Rehnquist argued that the legislative grant to the judiciary to superintend
settlements entered by the Justice Department raised Article III problems.
His point can be expanded to a more general proposition: once the parties have
agreed to withdraw or settle a lawsuit, no "case" or "controversy" exists. See
Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain; Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness
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advanced that a federal court, circumscribed by Article III "case or
controversy" requirements, has no authority to decide to vacate a decision
when the parties have no current dispute (or to the extent that there is a
dispute, it exists between the parties, seeking settlement, and the court,
imposing a legal ruling).15 This form of argument appears in the Bonner
Mall case, in which, while both parties agreed to settlement, only one side
has requested that the Supreme Court vacate the underlying opinions as
"moot."1 54  The existence of consent decrees, however, refutes this
jurisdictional objection.'5
of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 902-03 (noting the problem but
concluding that consent decrees can be analogized to other uncontested
proceedings such as naturalization). Further, if both parties agree to settle, the
judiciary has little information to judge the wisdom of parties' decisions. See Resnik,
Judging Consent, supra note 144, at 85-101.
153. Intimations of this jurisdictional proposition can be found in Judge Kearse's
opinion, holding that the Second Circuit will not vacate its own opinions at parties'
request. See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir.
1993) (to do so "would allow the parties to obtain an advisory opinion of the court
of appeals in a case in which there may not be, or may no longer be, any genuine case
or controversy; the federal courts of course have no jurisdiction to render such
opinions").
154. See U.S. Bancorp Merits Brief, Bonner Mall, supra note 46, at 15-27. That
argument relies, in part, on a line of Supreme Court cases discussing the requirement
that appellate courts vacate, either under "inherent" or express powers (see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2061), judgments that have become moot while an appeal is pending. See, e.g., United
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950) ("The established practice of the
Court in dealing with a civil case ...which has become moot while on its way here
or pending our decision . .. is to reverse or vacate the. judgment below. . . ."). Those
who oppose vacatur on consent distinguish Munsingwear as an instance in which
events unrelated to the parties (changes in law or fact) mooted the controversy.
As the Supreme Court subsequently explained, Munsingwear is an instance in which
appellate review was "prevented through happenstance." Karcher v. May, 484 U.S.
72, 82 (1987). See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 11 F.3d at 381 (summarizing the
arguments); United States v. Garde, 848 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (distinguishing
Munsingwear from instances when litigants who were dissatisfied by outcomes could
avoid cases by obtaining vacatur); Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (opinions debate applicability of Munsingwear).
155. Moreover, whatever the potential force of jurisdictional objections, Article
III "case" and "controversy" doctrine is sufficiently elastic-standing doctrine being
a notorious example-that additional arguments are needed to shape this juris-
dictional position. See, e.g., the arguments by both the United States (U.S. Amicus,
Bonner Mall, supra note 45, at 10-22) and U.S. Bancorp. (U.S. Bancorp Merits Brief, Bonner
Mall, supra note 46, at 30-41), claiming that "fairness," "public policy" and
"prudential" concerns also support vacatur on consent. See also Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305 (1988) (disagreement among justices as to whether the issue was moot and if
so, whether mootness is a doctrine rooted in Article III as compared to a prudential
limitation; Chief Justice Rehnquist urged that an additional exception to mootness
permits the Supreme Court to review cases mooted after certiorari was granted so
as to avoid resources having been "squandered" on briefing and argument, id. at
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Consent decrees are not the only practices of courts that complicate
jurisdictional and custom-based refusals to vacate on consent. The argument
that courts do not try to "rewrite history"' 156 is also descriptively inaccurate;
courts do "rewrite" upon occasion. One example comes from legislative
instructions to set aside convictions.' 57  Legislative goals include treating
the proceedings "as if they never occurred."' 5 1 Under Justice Department
Guidelines, to expunge is "to destroy, delete or obliterate; it implies not a
331-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
156. See Fisch, supra note 6.
157. See, e.g., the Federal Youth Correction Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1950),
repealed by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 218, 98
Stat. 2027 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) See also Fred C.
Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of Convictions Set Aside Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act,
1981 DUKE L.J. 477, 485-86; Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Although the FYCA has been repealed, two provisions of current federal law
permit expungement. The first, 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (1988), provides that when a person
is "found guilty of an offense under" the Controlled Substance Act, is under twenty-
one "at the time of the offense," has no prior convictions relating to controlled
substances, is placed on probation for under a year and commits no violations, and
applies, a court "shall enter an expungement order" that directs "that there be
expunged from all official records, except those nonpublic records [of the
Department of Justice], all references to his [or her] arrest ...... A second provision
is "civil," but derivative, in that it provides for expungement of records of civil
penalties assessed under 21 U.S.C. § 844a(a) against those individuals convicted under
21 U.S.C. § 844 of possession of a controlled substance listed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)
in a "personal use" amount. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 844a(a),O) (1988). To meet the criteria of
this section, one need not be under 21. The act requires that the individual is for
the first time assessed and has paid the civil penalty, that the individual has no
convictions under federal or state law relating to controlled substances, and is
willing to submit to a drug test establishing that the person is drug-free. 21 U.S.C.
§§ 844aO) (1)-(5) (1988).
Under this legislation, the Department of Justice is supposed to keep records of
expunction sealed. 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 844a(j) (1988). Empirical data
on the frequency, modes, and efficacy of expunction are difficult to obtain.
According to staff in the Department of Justice (Justice Management Division,
Information Resources Management), from 1981 until October 1993, the Department
had records of 360 expunctions under 18 U.S.C. §3607(c) or its predecessor and 646
instances of records becoming "nonpublic." No data were available from Justice on
expunction under the civil statute, apparently in part because of lack of
automation and coding. Memorandum of Brian Raphael, Reference Librarian, USC
Law Center (Nov. 10, 1993). A subsequent memorandum from the Federal Bureau of
Investigations indicated that, as of April of 1994, "920 requests for expungement . .
. have been directed to the FBI and are currently being processed .... To date, the
FBI has finalized [in coordination with the National Archives and Records
Administration] 258 expungements." Letter of Section Chief, Information Resources
Division to Mr. Raphael (Apr. 5, 1994) (on file with author).
158. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2335(c) (Supp. V 1978), as quoted in Doe v. Webster, 606
F.2d 1226, 1242 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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legal act, but a physical destruction." '159 Under federal law, such orders
"restore such person, in the contemplation of the law, to the status he [or





With an expunction, a person does not commit perjury if that person does
not "acknowledge such arrests or institution of criminal proceedings, or the
results thereof, in response to an inquiry made of him [or her] for any
purpose."'61
But expunction is not only a creature of the legislature. Courts, as an
exercise of their "inherent powers," also order expunction of either arrest or
conviction records. To guide that decision, the circuits have formulated a
range of standards. 62  Some circuits describe themselves as acting under
"extraordinary circumstances, 163 others as preserving rights,4 balancing
159. U.S. Department of Justice, Order DOJ 2710.10(A) (Apr.20, 1990) ("Federal
Court Orders for the Disposition of Official Records Other than Under the
Controlled Substances Act") at 4(a), and Order DOJ 2710.7D (May 3, 1993)
("Recordkeeping for Violations Committed under the Controlled Substances Act")
at 4(a) (obtained by a Freedom of Information Act request).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (1988).
161. Id.
162. See United States v. Gillock, 771 F. Supp. 904, 908 (W.D. Tenn. 1991) (reviewing
the cases and discussing the difficulty of establishing "specific standards" for the
exercise of courts' inherent power to expunge).
163. Many courts have invoked the Tenth Circuit's instruction that the "power
to order expungement of a state arrest record" is narrow, and appropriately done
only in "unusual or extreme cases," such as "'where the arrest itself was . . .
unlawful . . . or . . . represented harassing action by the police, or where the statute
under which the arrestee was prosecuted was itself unconstitutional."' Shipp v.
Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925,
927 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975)); see also United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069,
1069-70 (10th Cir. 1993); Geary v. United States, 901 F.2d 679, 680 (8th Cir. 1990); Reyes
v. Supervisor of Drug Enforcement Admin., 834 F.2d 1093, 1098 (1st Cir. 1987); Allen v.
Webster, 742 F.2d 153, 155 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387, 390
(8th Cir. 1976). District courts within the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have
also invoked this test. See Guglielmo v. Cunningham, 811 F. Supp. 31, 40 (D.N.H. 1993);
Schwab v. Gallas, 724 F. Supp 509, 510-11 (N.D. Ohio 1989); United States v. Johnson,
714 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D. Fla. 1989). Some of the courts that have used the
"extraordinary circumstances" test have also required exhaustion of administrative
remedies. See Reyes, 834 F.2d at 1098-99 (plaintiff seeking to correct records accusing
him of terrorist activities).
Note that under the Neary test, "extraordinary circumstances" are required to
deny a motion to vacate an opinion on consent. For discussion of the limited
information available to judges, making that test very difficult to apply, see Norman
I. Krug Real Estate Inv., Inc. v. Praszker, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1814, 1826-1828 (1994) (Kline,
J., concurring).
164. The D.C. Circuit, which has issued several opinions on the issue, requires
expunction "'when that remedy is necessary and appropriate in order to preserve
basic legal rights."' Livingston v. United States Dep't of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C.
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equities, 165 or some amalgam thereof. 66  The reported instances of
expunction are not numerous. 67  Further, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
Cir. 1985) (quoting Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
880 (1973)). Circumstances held to be the basis for expunction include when a student
"by happenstance" and with "no probable cause" was wrongly detained and arrested
by local police, Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (D.C. Cir. 1974); and when mass
arrest procedures made judicial determination of probable cause impossible, Sullivan,
478 F.2d at 970.
The Ninth Circuit has relied on the D.C. rule that expungement of state and
local records can be an "'appropriate remedy in the wake of police action in
violation of constitutional rights."' Maurer v. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Dep't,
691 F.2d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 968). See also Fendler v.
United States Parole Commission, 774 F.2d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing
expunction of information in a pre-sentence report and stating that "[flederal
courts have the equitable power 'to order the expungement of Government records
where necessary to vindicate rights secured by the Constitution or by statute"')
(quoting Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (emphasis added by the
Fendler court)).
165. The Second Circuit has described its expunction jurisprudence as determining
the "proper balancing of the equities." See United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536,
539 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978). See also Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862,
868 Od Cir. 1975) ("Determination of the propriety of an order directing expungement
involves a balancing of interests; the harm caused to an individual by the existence
of any records must be weighed against the utility to the Government of their
maintenance.").
In theory and in practice, this test could be more or less exacting than the
"exceptional circumstances" test. In practice, cases involving a balancing test
sometimes tilt the scales against expunction. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 343 F.
Supp. 804, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (creating a presumption against granting expunction by
stating: "even in the situation where a person has been acquitted of charges against
him, the arrest records and other materials of identification, no doubt, may be
retained unless: (1) there is a statute that directs return of such arrest records; (2)
the arrest was unlawful; or (3) the record of the arrest is the 'fruit' of an illegal
seizure") (emphasis in original).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938
(1990); Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539-40; see also Pinto, 1 F.3d at 1069-70 (federal courts have
the power to expunge convictions upon determinations that such convictions were
"unconstitutional, illegal, or obtained through government misconduct").
167. A review of reported federal cases over the 20-year period from 1974 to 1993
found 47 instances of requests for expunction under courts' "inherent powers." Of
the ten requests granted, one was for the expunction of both an arrest and
conviction record and the other nine were for expunction of arrest records. See
United States v. Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 622 (D.D.C. 1978) (on remand from the
reversal of a defendant's conviction, a district judge found that "flagrant illegal
activity of the government" mandated expunction of both the arrest and the
conviction record). The instances in which courts under their inherent powers
expunged arrest records were: Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(expungement upheld when "mature" individuals had been arrested "wholly without
cause" during a peaceful "prayer vigil" near the White House; the court awarded
damages because of the violation of first amendment rights and because of tortious
conduct by police officers of the District of Columbia); Washington Mobilization
Comm. v. Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 121 n.5 (1977) (expungement of arrest records upheld
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are skeptical of the practice. While one aspect of the critique is predicated
upon separations of powers concerns, 168 other criticisms parallel those raised
when prosecutor could make no "showing of probable cause for arrests"); Menard, 498
F.2d at 1023-25 (student arrested with no basis); United States v. Van Wagner, 746
F. Supp. 619, 620-21 (E.D. Va. 1990) (government initiated major criminal charges
against Van Wagner, then "concluded he was in fact innocent;" the arrest record
prevented him from obtaining loans and government contracts); United States v.
Johnson, 714 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (after a court ordered defendant's acquittal
on assault charges, it subsequently ordered expunction of the arrest record);
Natwig v. Webster, 562 F. Supp. 225 (D.R.I. 1983) (former university student who had
been arrested in controversy over alcohol purchase obtained expunction when
evidence showed that the record might jeopardize his capacity to emigrate and
pursue his profession, and the government could not demonstrate any need to
maintain the record, because no indictment was ever returned); United States v.
Cook, 480 F. Supp. 262 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (denied government's efforts to set aside an
agreed-upon expunction after an indictment was dismissed on the government's
motion; at issue was the authority of an Assistant U.S. Attorney to agree under
Department of Justice guidelines on expunction); United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp.
1218, 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (expunction granted for record of lawyer's arrest, more
than eleven years earlier, which resulted in a dismissal of the indictment; the court
explained the arrest as a "source of embarrassment or misunderstanding"); Urban v.
Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706, 708, 711 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (class action expunction on behalf of
54 people, suspected to be members of a "motorcycle gang," all of whom were arrested
in a "dragnet" arrest without "probable cause;" thereafter the police had
distributed leaflets with all of their pictures).
In an additional seven cases, appellate courts instructed trial courts to
consider further the request for expunction. See, e.g., Livingston v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 75, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (vacating a district court
refusal to grant expunction and ordering a remand to a different district, in which
the arrest records had been made); Maurer, 691 F.2d at 437 (federal courts have the
inherent authority to order expunction of "local arrest records" and district
court erred in assuming state prisoner possessed state law remedies on which he had
to rely).
168. See United States v. Scott, 793 F.2d 117, 118 (5th Cir. 1986) (separation-of-
power concerns raised by a federal court order directed at "expung[ing] and
obliterat[ing] all records and files" of a conviction; court not "empowered" to
grant expungement in a case "in which the validity of the original conviction is
unquestioned."). The Fifth Circuit has, however, permitted expunction when the
"only purpose" of an arrest was to "harass voting workers," United States v.
McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1967), and a district court has granted expunction
of an arrest record when it was unopposed by an assistant United States Attorney.
Cook, 480 F. Supp. at 262.
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, has gone further in
calling into question courts' inherent powers to expunge records of the Executive
Branch. See Scruggs v. United States, 929 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1991) (opining that the
Constitution does not prohibit keeping records of illegal arrests; the court also
found the request untimely and arguably in conflict with statutes authorizing the
Department of Justice to keep records). Cf. Diamond v. United States, 649 F.2d 496,
497-98 (7th Cir. 1981) (remanding for the government to explain the need for keeping
records and concluding that an individual seeking expungement did not have to
prove that the arrest "was unlawful . . . was made for purposes of harassment or
where the statute under which the arrest was made subsequently was held
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about vacatur on consent. As one court put it, the "judicial editing of history
is likely to produce a greater harm than that sought to be corrected. '" 6 9
Of course, distinctions can be drawn between the two practices.
Expunction is sometimes conditioned upon a defendant's compliance with
the terms of a sentence. In Judge Gesell's phrase, such a conviction has been
"expiated by responsible conduct,''170 sometimes evidenced in a certificate
to the court. Expunction is sometimes animated by the desire to help a
deserving individual (frequently a youth) by protecting that person from a
misguided moment of youthful folly. At other times, expunction is
predicated on a desire to protect an individual from suffering the
consequences of government misconduct. Expunction is sometimes an
artifact of commitment to rehabilitation, and when interest in that goal of
the criminal justice system wanes, so does legislative authorization of
expunction. 
7 1
Yet, like vacatur on consent, expunging records is not completely
efficacious. Although sealed, records are often kept for future purposes and
of course, in practice, the events are known; they have taken place.
I7 1
Indeed, like vacatur, opinions themselves record the fact of expunction and
supply information about individuals and events.173  In sum, expunction is
unconstitutional").
169. Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972) (describing the court's
"privilege to expunge matters of public record [as] one of exceedingly narrow scope"
and declining to expunge a conviction found invalid because of the failure to advise
the defendant of the right to counsel). See also Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567, 568 (5th
Cir. 1978) (also concerned about "editing of public records").
170. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 725, 728 (D.D.C. 1971) (limiting
distribution of records to "law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes"
and federal agencies for employment purposes but denying request for expunction),
rev'd, Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ordering expunction).
171. See Zacharias, supra note 157, at 493 & n.95. The original proposal for
expunction was grounded in the view that youths could be rehabilitated. See COMM.
ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME, supra note 12, at Appendix II (discussion of the English
borstal system as a model for the United States).
172. See Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975) (a youth's
conviction was set aside under the FYCA, but that set-aside did not require that
court records be changed, and, therefore, the reporting of the arrest and
conviction by a credit agency after the individual reached adulthood was not
illegal), aff'd, 537 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1976); Aidan R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudicative
Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147; Jay L.
Schaefer, The Use of Expunged Convictions in Federal Courts, 35 FED. B.J. 107 (1976).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218, 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1976), in which
the court, granting expunction because an arrest was "a source of embarrassment
or misunderstanding to [a lawyer's] professional detriment," named the lawyer and
detailed the events giving rise to the arrest.
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an example of "legislative and judicial bodies finding compelling policy
reasons for ignoring in law what has occurred in fact .... 174
Another illustration of court-ordered alterations of "fact" and/or "law"
is the practice of "depublishing" an opinion-commonplace in California.
While an intermediate appellate court can determine that its opinion is of
sufficient import to be published, the California Supreme Court may
subsequently order that opinion "depublished" and not used for precedent.
The court may make that decision without providing either a hearing or a
statement of reasons.17 About one hundred cases a year, "more cases than
the supreme court decides each year by signed written opinion," are
depublished.'76 That practice has also generated confusion: the signal is
that something is wrong with the opinion, but exactly what is unclear. 77
While California is reputed to be the court with the most extensive
depublication practice, other courts both decline to "publish" decisions
7 1
and also "withdraw" opinions.179  Further, courts amend decisions at
litigants' request. 1"°
Given consent decrees, expunction, depublication, withdrawal, and
amendment of opinions, the (perhaps appealing) arguments that courts should
not be viewed as servants of the parties nor in the position to revise history
have less credibility. Courts sometimes act at parties' behests, and sometimes
174. Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (also discussing other
instances of sealing evidence, pleadings, and adoption records, and of annulling
marriages).
175. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear, supra note 26, at 1034-35 (summarizing the
practice under California Rule of Court 976). See also Gerald F. Uelmen, Publication and
Depublication of California Court of Appeal Opinions: Is the Eraser Mightier than the Pencil?, 26 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1007, 1012-20 (1993) (analyzing different rates of depublication of opinions
authored by the different appellate divisions).
176. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear, supra note 26, at 1035.
177. Id. at 1036.
178. Each federal circuit has rules to govern the practice. See, e.g., 9th Cir. R.
36-2 (Disposition by Opinion).
179. See Fenner v. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 605 (9th Cir. 1983) (udge
Chambers, dissenting from an "Order Withdrawing Memorandum," stated that his
"brothers" were "suppress[ing]" their memorandum opinion).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993). The original
opinion (filed on August 4, 1993) had named an assistant U.S. Attorney whom the
court stated had misbehaved. The revised opinion referred to the individual as the
"AUSA"; the list of lawyers in the case included the name of the assistant, who was
also named in a newspaper story about the case. See Henry Weinstein, U.S. Attorney
Asks Court to Erase Criticism, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at B1, B3 (a "unanimous decision by
three conservative judges" criticized the prosecution and "lambasted the U.S.
Attorney's office for failing to acknowledge the extent and significance" of the
assistant's misconduct). See also EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 748 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1984)
(denying request by EEOC to withdraw an opinion).
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alter prior acts. Indeed, courts that have granted vacatur on consent could
anchor that act by reference to the longstanding traditions of these related
practices. Aside from the proposition that all of these practices should be
prohibited, the question remains whether courts should add vacatur on
consent to their repertoire. Should courts offer the option of vacating
opinions, and thereby of confusing or clouding history, just as courts offer
sometimes ambiguous, party-driven consent judgments, expunge criminal
conviction records, and depublish or amend opinions?
5. Utility
Responses depend upon evaluation of three other major arguments, again
elaborated in the context of vacatur but central to the general topic of what
forms of process courts should provide. The first is about utility.
Judges Ralph Winter (of the Second Circuit) and Frank Easterbrook (of
the Seventh Circuit), both identified as scholars of law and economics, have
advanced different views of the utility of the practice of vacatur on appeal.
Judge Winter, who favors the practice, wrote that refusing to vacate a
judgment forces litigants "to bear the costs and risks of further litigation"-all
for some speculative and "overstated" threat of future litigation that might
be averted if vacatur is not permitted.'' Picking up this theme, judges for
the Federal Circuit argued that refusal to vacate on settlement not only is
"unjust" to the parties and an unfair expenditure of their resources, but also
"wasteful of the resources of the judiciary."'8 2  In contrast, for Judge
Easterbrook, who is opposed to vacatur, prohibiting vacatur on appeal will
prompt parties to settle before a trial court renders its judgment.'8 3 If not,
the "slightly higher costs" imposed on those litigants will "reduce the trouble
encountered by litigants and judges tomorrow. "184
This discussion quickly points out a recurrent problem of utilitarian
analyses: its outcome depends upon whose utility is measured and how it is
181. Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985). See also
Justice Baxter's opinion for the California Supreme Court, in Neary v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 121-22 (Cal. 1992) (parties who know of the option to
settle on appeal will not rely on it to try cases that can be settled earlier). In
December of 1993, the reach of Nestle was limited by another panel of the Second
Circuit that prohibited vacatur on its own opinions as a part of a settlement.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1993).
182. Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prod. Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 280 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
183. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Fisch, supra note
6, at 632-39.
184. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303.
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assessed. For Judge Winter, the utility at issue is that of the immediate
parties, whose resources are (he argues) most at stake, and whom (he assumes)
will spend those resources and go through with the appeal, rather than settle
on other terms.18 The California Supreme Court implicitly agreed with
Judge Winter when it enthusiastically endorsed vacatur by creating a "strong
presumption in favor of allowing stipulated reversals," which can only be
overcome by a "public interest" that is "specific, demonstrable, well
established, and compelling."'8 6 As that court explained: "parties are the
persons (or entities) most affected by a judgment, which is the ultimate
product of their sustained effort and expense."
' 87
Judge Easterbrook's response is to dispute title. For him, judgments are
"public act[s] of government, "18 the existence of which cannot be the
subject of parties' contracts.89 What is the source of that ownership?
Obviously, public dollars support judges and jurors; if the California Supreme
Court is correct that litigants "own" the judgment, that ownership comes
through public subsidies. And it is to the public that Easterbrook turns. For
him, adjudication has third-party benefits, and once bestowed, those benefits
become sufficiently powerful so as to outweigh the parties'
"entitlement[s]."' 190 As he explained:
When a clash between genuine adversaries produces a precedent ...the
judicial system ought not allow the social value of that precedent, created at
cost to the public and other litigants, to be a bargaining chip in the process of
185. It may be that, given the rise of managerial judging, trial judges will be more
likely to call the parties' possible bluff-more willing to refuse a settlement
conditioned on vacatur and see if in fact the parties settle or pursue an
appeal-whereas appellate court judges (less involved in negotiations with parties
about settlement) will be more likely to accept parties' claims about the conditions
of settlement at face value.
186. Neary, 834 P.2d at 125.
187. Id. at 123.
188. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1300.
189. Id. at 1303. In his hat as scholar, Judge Easterbrook wrote that a "court
will know less than the parties do," that judges are entitled to become involved in
consent- decrees, and that contracts "born in court," that is, consent decrees, do
not "become suspect" because of that fact. Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract
in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 21, 30. As in the Memorial Hospital opinion,
this essay stresses his concern with the effects of consent decrees on third parties
not represented in the bargaining. Id. at 31-33.
190. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302.
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settlement. The precedent, a public act of a public official, is not the parties'
property.191
The weight accorded third party interests relates to one of the current
procedural trends that I detailed earlier. First, public dollars fund many court
programs for settlements, but third parties reap neither the benefits of judicial
insights made during the course of settlement discussions about the value of
claims, nor necessarily the information generated by discovery and pretrial
litigation or alternative dispute resolution. Nevertheless, these processes are
justified as useful both as docket-reducing mechanisms (and therefore
beneficial to third parties) and as socially appropriate resolutions of disputes.
Second, to the extent a refusal to vacate is linked to the future use of
judgments, it is another illustration of contemporary interests in aggregation
and consolidation. As each case is increasingly understood as a piece of a
larger "litigation," the third party interests become more vivid; linking the
cases makes plain the utility of preclusion and of reduced judicial investment
in repetitive decisionmaking on similar sets of facts.
Judge Winter's response is that those third parties may well be disserved
by forcing litigants into the role of "unwilling private attorneys general. 1 92
The appellants seeking settlement are individuals who, in Judge Winter's
view, would flunk Rule 23's test to determine who can adequately represent
a class. Why would future litigants want to rely on those who want to settle
and have no interest in the pursuit of legal claims in appellate courts? 93
One answer might be to gamble: if put to the choice of full appeal or
settlement without vacatur, these litigants may well settle, and future parties
will then be able to rely on trial court decisions that were the products of
vigorous adversarial efforts. Easterbrook's other comeback-were the
conversation to be direct-is to move to another set of utilities: those of the
191. Id. The D.C. Circuit found this paragraph "persuasive," applying the Seventh
Circuit rule in refusing a motion by the United States to vacate an appellate court
decision that was "mooted after judgment only because the parties ha[d] entered into
a settlement." See In re United States, 927 F.2d 626, 627-28 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Judge
Douglas Ginsburg for the panel). But see Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), in which an en banc court ordered vacatur of a district court opinion
that had "mooted" prior to the appellate court's ruling. What kind of "postjudg-
ment contingencies" should properly be understood as rendering the "underlying
controversy moot" prompted a lengthy dissent from Judges Edwards, Mikva, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and Robinson, making the D.C. rule less clear on requests for
vacatur of trial court judgments as a part of consent judgments. Id. at 709-18.
192. Nestle v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985).
193. As Judge Finesilver notes, the party that agrees to settle is a "victor . . .
[who] has little interest in preserving the precedential value of the judgment below."
Benavides v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Colo. 1993).
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"judicial branch" itself, which "retains" an independent "interest" (one he
identifies as the "orderliness of its own processes"). 94  Tidiness is an
interest that the California Supreme Court also weighs, but its form of
"order" is the "orderly termination of litigation"-and with that definition,
orderliness cuts in favor of vacatur.' 9' Judge Easterbrook might then argue
that his tidiness takes into account the discussion elaborated above-that in
practice, these vacated opinions are reused. Judges cannot bear (or afford) to
ignore them. Easterbrook might thus conclude that courts should not try to
"rewrite history" because it is inefficient, generating confusion, not
instruction.
Who's been keeping score? How do the utilities balance? Which ones
count, and how much do they weigh? Should one attempt to model the
effects vacatur by consent might have on those who file suit?'96 On the
willingness to settle? At what time and under what conditions? Should one
attempt to measure the changes in bargains that vacatur on consent might
work over time and across cases, as in different iterations of a game? Does
the substantive area of law inform the discussion, because in certain fields,
repeat players are identifiable sets of litigants? Are these empirical questions,
not yet informed by the requisite data, or are these questions for which data
will never suffice? 97 Does the Ninth Circuit have it right, by remitting the
balancing to judge to make decisions on a case-by-case basis?' 98 With what
kind of information?'99
The underlying question under this approach is when the usefulness to
litigants of being able to buy and sell risk (of reversal on appeal, of rehearing,
certiorari, or remand) outweighs social investments in the production of
adjudication and often unspecified third party interests in the decisions thus
produced. The calculation relies on subjective evaluation of each of the
elements: the willingness to expose litigants to risk, the import of courts'
194. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1303.
195. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119,120 (Cal. 1992).
196. One could hypothesize that more individuals will file suit, in search of the
"bounty" that might be offered when vacatur on consent is desired. A competing
view posits that, with the possibility of vacatur on consent, defendants may be less
willing to settle until after trial, and thus will discourage the filing of suits by
those unable to afford the costs of extended litigation.
197. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28 (1976).
198. See, e.g., Allard v. DeLorean, 884 F.2d 464, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1989). For another
effort at line drawing, see William D. Zeller, Note, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement
Conditioned Upon the Vacatur of Entered Judgments, 96 YALE L.J. 860 (1987).
199. See Resnik, Judging Consent, supra note 144, at 85-96 (difficulty of judicial
appraisal of consent judgments, when parties before them urge their approval).
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decisions, and the value of those decisions to third parties and the polity.
Further, converting this discussion into one that pits a model of courts as
institutions for "dispute resolution" against a model that situates courts as
institutions for the announcement of "public values' ' ° does not resolve the
utility of issuing or declining to issue vacatur on consent. If one posits courts
as dispute resolvers, the question remains whether they do it better or worse
by offering or withholding the option of vacatur on consent. And if one
claims that the determinative point is that courts announce public values, the
question then becomes whether vacating judgments on consent is in conflict
with or expressive of "public values." That, of course, is the next issue.
6. Law, Guidance, Public Morality, and Order
In those opinions that reject vacatur on appeal, judges make an
argument that can be distinguished from either utility or economy or unfair
procedural advantage. Justice J. Anthony Kline, for the intermediate
California appellate court in Neary, described courts as institutions that
generate "legal truth," that, once spoken, must not be "trivialize[d]" by
vacatur; to do so would "undermine the integrity of the entire judicial
process."' '2 Justice Joyce Kennard, in dissent on the California Supreme
Court in Neary, picked up these themes: "Public respect for the courts is
eroded" when people can buy their way out of decisions, she wrote.2 2
Arguing that appellate courts would be less open to bargains that require the
vacatur of their opinions, she said "the work product of our trial courts
deserves respect too," that trial courts are the "focal point of the judicial
system," whose outputs ("presumptively correct") should not be ."discard[ed]
• . . without any showing of legal error."2 3 Judge Amalya Kearse protests
200. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
201. 278 Cal. Rptr. 773, 778 (Ct. App. 1991). Judge Frank Easterbrook's complaint
against rewriting history (In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir.
1988))-which is catalogued above as an efficiency argument-might also be about
integrity; that it undermines the power of the judiciary to attempt to change
history.
202. 834 P.2d at 127 (citing Fisch, supra note 6).
203. Id. at 128. Moreover, in the federal courts, while the "clearly erroneous"
standard protects judges' factfinding (see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)), juries' factfinding,
cloaked with constitutional dignity by virtue of the Seventh Amendment, cannot
be set aside unless it is "so clear that reasonable persons could reach no other
conclusion than that asserted on appeal." See, e.g., Clipper v. Takoma Park, 876 F.2d
17, 19 note (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting McElveen v. County of Prince William, 725 F.2d
954, 958 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984)); see also Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry.,
321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) ("Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the
jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences . . . or
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vacatur of appellate court decisions as "increasing the vulnerability of the
judicial system to manipulation. "20 Magistrate Judge Carol E. Heckman
argues that agreements that include vacatur make "the court... an unwilling
third-party participant in [the] settlement process, which is not an appropriate
role for a court."2"5 Trial Judge Sherman Finesilver grounds his refusal to
vacate on consent in part on respect for the judicial system: Judicial
decisions, he says, are "not for sale."' 0°
At work here are arguments about the meaning of courts as institutions.
One vision is of courts as instruments of the public, of judges as guardians of
the public, and of the public as having an interest in adjudication beyond its
function of concluding disputes of the parties or across a series of disputes
over time. Courts are not "servants" of the parties; courts have an
independence from the parties, not only as the voices of other parties'
interests, but as institutions expressive of and accountable to the public.
207
Under this vision, once public officials have undertaken to adjudicate factual
and legal contentions, that act has normative weight and must be treated
with sanctity. Words associated with religion are apt here, for symbolism and
legitimacy are at issue.20 When judges and jurors have completed the task
of delving through conflicting claims of rights and constructed a story framed
by principles and based on the rule of law, that act must not be disturbed,
except when subsequent judges or jurors, once again seriously at work, and
again plowing the minutiae of the dispute, sorting, crediting and discrediting,
assigning value, finding meaning, constructing narratives, come to find an
error in the first judgments made.20
At this symbolic level, cases protesting vacatur on consent can be linked
to other contemporary developments in legal scholarship and in social policy-
because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.").
204. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 385 (3d Cir. 1993).
205. J.A. Brundage Plumbing v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 153 F.R.D. 36, 38
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (as "courtesy" to parties, vacating prior decision and calling for
Second Circuit to reconsider the Nestle rule, discussed supra notes 181, 192).
206. Benavides v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (D. Colo. 1993).
207. Catharine Wells' work on juries' role in enabling local contextual govern-
ance can be understood as expressive of this viewpoint. See Catharine Pierce Wells,
Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348,
2393-13 (1990). Some of my earlier essays on adjudication contain these themes. See,
e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 5.
208. See THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 59-71 (1935), suggested to
me by Catharine Wells.
209. Relatively few commentators have worked on theories of factfinding. See,
e.g., Wells, supra note 207; George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 14 (1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229
(1985).
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making. In the academy, some call for "standards" and for clear measures of
evaluation.21° In politics, leaders proclaim their search for a "politics of
meaning"-a quest for values. Some see the new source of "meaning" as
religion; others hope to find it in something called "communitarian" values,
still others by way of multi-cultural conversations. Depending on who is
speaking, one also sometimes hears a nostalgic tone in this call for meaning,
as if somehow, "we" (translated here as the polity in the United States) used
to believe in something, used to have shared narratives and values, but now
we don't.
The nostalgia makes me nervous. The "old days" were deeply
exclusionary and contained many narratives and values that I do not share.
But nostalgia aside, I do find solace in hearing judges speak of the meaning
and even the majesty of their work. I like that they lay claim not only to
their own work as important but also that they take seriously the efforts of
other judges and of juries as adjudicators-indeed, that they take this work so
seriously that they are willing to put litigants to further expense and risk, if
need be, and to constrain parties' options, rather than have those judgments
vacated without any finding of legally-cognizable "error." In contrast, I find
it disheartening to read judges who dismiss the work of these public actors,
reduce it to a "product," and then award sole ownership of judgments to the
parties."' I am depressed that many of these judges do not have much
good to say about judging. When I help to pay their salaries, when I watch
them in their robes, when I stand when they enter the room, I want to
believe that what they do is something more than validate the wishes of the
parties before them.
But those judges and commentators who insist on respect for both the
practical meaning and symbolic weight of the judicial process have a problem:
the last two decades of procedural developments. Trial judges have spent the
last twenty years rewriting their job description so that what they now do
regularly is negotiate with parties, managing them in the hopes of disposing
of disputes by settlement. Congress has recently taken upon itself the task of
reforming the civil justice system."' In its legislative effort, it wrote an act
210. Cf. Arthur Danto, Hand-Painted Pop, NATION, Sept. 27, 1993, at 327, 332 (in light
of the array of different contemporary artistic endeavors, "there is no . . . single set
of critical principles that will do for the art of our time" what critical
commentary could do for Modernism); Derrick A. Bell, Introduction to Symposium, Multiple
Cultures and the Law: Do We Have a Legal Canon?, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1993).
211. Neary, 834 P.2d at 123 (a court's judgment is the "ultimate product of [the
parties'] sustained effort and expense").
212. See The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089,
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. 1990).
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that mentioned the word "adjudication" only once;213 Congress instructed
district court planners to focus on differential management of cases, setting
firm dates for proceedings, controlling discovery, exploring parties
"receptivity to, and the propriety of, settlement or proceeding with the
litigation," and the desirability of alternative dispute resolution. 14  Both
Congress and the judiciary are devising rules that delegate factfinding to ever-
lower level officials, 215 and the Supreme Court has endorsed arbitration as
an alternative forum for decisionmaking on rights protected by federal
statutes; arbitration is praised for its "simplicity, informality, and
expedition."" 6
Importantly, efforts to engender settlement have not been confined to
the trial bench. Both trial and appellate judges have been touting settlement
as central to the judicial process.217 Recall that every appellate court in the
country is installing settlement programs and bragging about their success,
and that some appellate courts vacate their own opinions at parties'
requests.
2 18
213. The Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471; Pub. L. 101-650, § 102 ("The
purposes of each [Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction] plan are to facilitate
deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve
litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil
disputes.").
214. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. IV 1992).
215. See, e.g., the increasing authority of magistrate judges described in A
Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247, 271-72
(Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1993) (discussing "growing confidence in
the magistrate judges system" and "little likelihood that significant elements of
existing magistrate judge authority will be declared unconstitutional"); REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 74-76 (April 2, 1990) (more authority for
bankruptcy judges); 55-58 (proposing adjudication of disability claims by non-Article
III judges). See generally Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts*: Revising the Domain of
Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1021, 1025-1032
(1994).
216. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991)
(interpreting congressional intent in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as
not precluding arbitration of the act's claims). See also Resnik, Many Doors? Closing
Doors? supra note 11.
217. As California Associate Justice Sonenshine explained, the "concern over the
inappropriateness of our court becoming involved in settlement conferences all but
vanished as the results [a forty percent rate of settlement] became known. If
litigants, the people for whom the profession exists, were better served by the
program, how could it be wrong." Sonenshine, supra note 110, at 1003.
218. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 1355
(8th Cir. 1985) (vacating its opinion at 765 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1985) and ordering the
district court to vacate its opinion "in light of the Settlement Agreement"); see also
Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc. v. Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n, 895 F.2d 711,
714 & n.3 (l1th Cir. 1990) (vacating its own opinion, in part because the settlement
included the permanent injunction called for by the court). But see Manufacturers
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The celebration of party autonomy and of dispute resolution without
adjudication is simply not confined to the trial level. The distinction that
some have drawn- between the unreviewed trial court opinion (hence an
opinion that is not yet precedent followed by a settlement that avoids the risk
of reversal) and the appellate court decision (for which further review is
discretionary219- is fine. Litigants continue to bear risks of continued
conflict and defeat during the pendency of appeals, rehearings en banc, and
petitions for certiorari. Not only do appellate courts promote settlement, the
federal courts have just promulgated a rule authorizing them to mandate
lawyer and litigant participation in such efforts.2 Appellate courts also
have not been steadfast in their adherence to the written opinion; the
practices of depublication, amendment, and withdrawal of opinions are now
overshadowed by the frequency with which appellate courts issue rulings with
unpublished opinions.2 ' The effort to draw the line of permissible vacatur
on consent at the trial level is not persuasive.
Should opponents of vacatur seek to stop that practice but not these
other innovations? Justice Kennard says that vacatur on settlement will
"demoralize trial judges and jurors. If this court by its actions shows little
regard for the work of trial courts, we can hardly expect the public to hold
them in high esteem." 22 But how do litigants and appellate judges feel
when opinions are depublished without explanation? How do litigants feel
Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to vacate
appellate court opinions); Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1444 (10th Cir.
1993) (case by case determination); In re United States, 927 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(refusing to vacate its earlier opinion at 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989), during an
interval when the parties could have sought certiorari); Clipper v. Takoma Park, 898
F.2d 18 (4th Cit. 1989) (refusing to withdraw an earlier panel opinion after parties
had settled pending the petition for rehearing en banc); see also Lucich v. City of
Oakland, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 450, 455 (Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to retract its own
published opinion and distinguishing Neary as creating a presumption in favor of
vacatur of trial court opinions).
219. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 11 F.3d at 384.
220. FED. R. App. P. 33
221. See Daniel N. Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYST.
J. 405, 406-15 (1981) (since 1972, the Judicial Conference of the United States has had
a policy of selective publication; some evidence of "significant decisions" being
unpublished); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential
Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1167 (1978). See also Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished
Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940
(1989). But see Gilbert S. Merritt, Judges on Judging: The Decision Making Process in Federal
Courts of Appeals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1392-93 (1990) (concern overstated given on-line
services publication).
222. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 128 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
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when trial judges tell them, "settle, your case is not worth going to trial,"
when that judge knows only a little of the merits of the case? Or when
rulemakers propose that individuals who go to trial should be sanctioned
unless they can demonstrate results at trial that are significantly better than
what was offered in settlement? Are not these expressions of contemporary
"public values? ' 223
Earlier, I discussed how vacatur on settlement expresses a form of litigant
autonomy seemingly at odds with the rise of managerial judging. Yet the
ideology that animates vacatur on settlement is in one respect deeply
consistent with that of managerial judging and the expansion of alternative
dispute resolution. In promoting managerial judging, judges have been
persuasive in establishing that they should be given a greater commission,
that the task of factfinder was too narrow, confining, and unresponsive to
parties' "true" needs. As judges expanded their repertoires, to become
sometimes mediators, sometimes senior partners to lawyers on both sides of
the case, sometimes counselors to the parties, they have also demonstrated
that their role as adjudicators was neither important enough to command
their time exclusively nor useful enough to the parties as these other skills,
which are in no way unique to judges. Once trial judges have become
convinced that the activity of trying cases and deciding motions is not as
central as that of being the "manager of the docket, 2 4 then why should
appellate courts not acquiesce when parties on appeal express the same
sentiment? Since factfinding is not a special activity, why insist on its
longevity by preserving the jury verdicts in either Neary or Kaisha? And, if
settlement is the most-valued outcome at the trial level, why not similarly
embrace it at the appellate level? At the Supreme Court?
Those who want to refuse to vacate opinions on settlement must face
this deep ambivalence about adjudication. They can no longer invoke an
image of "the courts" as if that image conjures up shared meanings with
adjudication as the dominant mode. The purpose, nature, and shape of
courts-at least in civil adjudication, and perhaps in the criminal arena as
well-are up for grabs. The role of judges as speakers of law, as providers of
moral guidance and as crafters of shared narratives has been diminished,2.
223. Cf. Fisch, supra note 6, at 629 (concerned that vacatur on consent entails the
sacrifice of public values).
224. A phrase I borrow from Judge Rya Zobel, who presided at a panel on Alter-
native Dispute Resolution at the Annual Conference of the First Circuit (Sept. 1993).
225. In contrast, because of televised trials, courtroom exchanges and jury
verdicts may still provide a source of shared cultural stories.
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in large measure by judges themselves." 6 In 1935, Thurman Arnold wrote
that theology "occupies a rather precarious place in social life .... A similar
result in law, however, seems unlikely unless the judicial system is to lose its
prestige, or unless the faculty of 'reason' is to take a less important place in
the hierarchy of ideals."'227 Judges themselves have played a central role in
diminishing this prestige and in dislodging reasoned adjudication from its
place in the hierarchy.
D. Power
Like the utility argument, the claim that vacatur by settlement violates
the agreed-upon institutional role of courts is problematic. I have both
intuitions and preferences about both the utility and desirability of
adjudication in our governing structure, but less by way of argument about
why my intuitions and preferences should prevail. But there is one other
(and last) facet to explore, distinct from the "public values" discussion set
forth above and premised upon courts' history, traditions, and values.
In an increasingly crowded field, shared with litigants, lawyers,
insurance companies, arbitrators, special masters, and other dispute resolution
facilitators, judges don't quite blend in. What keeps judges distinct is that
they have more power than everyone else. However much judges have
blurred the lines between themselves and the host of dispute resolution
providers out there, they retain this fundamental and distinguishing attribute:
authority. It is that very power that is invoked to argue for the need to
involve Article III judges, and not underlings, in case management and
settlement.2 One watches that power in operation when a judge advises
settlement, for he or she just might be signalling something about what the
"law" requires.
226. An oft-provided explanation is that the cost of factfinding (with the partic-
ularly expensive element of fees paid to lawyers to generate that fact-finding) is
simply too great. While costs are unquestionably a factor, I believe that there is
more at work than costs. As I have described elsewhere, there is a deeper skepticism
about the enterprise of adjudication. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure
in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
227. ARNOLD, supra note 208, at 69.
228. Precisely because of that power edge, a group convened by Senator Biden, the
Foundation for Change, and the Brookings Institution, called for "judges" and not
other judicial officials, such as magistrate judges, to preside at pretrial conferences
and manage cases. See Report of a Task Force, Justice For All: Reducing Costs and
Delay in Civil Litigation, Procedural Recommendation 7, at 24; Procedural
Recommendation 11 at 28 (1989). As enacted, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
authorizes "judicial officers" (which includes both Article III judges and magistrate
judges) to control that process. See 28 U.S.C §§473(a), 482 (Supp. III 1991).
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Robert Cover captured it well, by entitling an essay on judging
"Violence and the Word." '229 Vacatur on consent is an exercise of that
power, and one that destroys law-made either by trial judges and juries or by
the appellate courts. What is the source of judges' power for that act of
destruction? I ask this question not to provoke a discussion of
jurisdiction,230 but to prompt a political discussion about the legitimacy of
the judicial act of vacatur on consent. Vacatur on consent can be conceived
to be simultaneously "jurispathic" and "jurisgenerative," terms Cover
employed to describe the activity of' law destruction and of law
generation.2 3  By the motion for vacatur, the litigants have come together
and asked a court to remove the state's view of the respective rights of the
parties and to restore the litigants' vision (possibly "jurisgenerative") of how
to resolve their dispute, and the court then complies. In contrast to this
interpretation stands Justice Kennard's approach; she might be understood as
perceiving the act of vacatur on consent to be "jurispathic," as engendering
in trial judges and jurors a sense of demoralization because the legal regime
that they determined to be "just" is discarded, without explanation other
than that of the parties' desires.
Identifying the tension between the law of the state and the law of the
disputants does not, however, locate the role that a judge should take when
asked to enter a motion for vacatur on consent. The parties ask that a judge
(as an instrument of the state) put the state's power behind the parties' desire
to terminate the legal regime (installed by the state's previously expressed
judgment of the merits of the dispute). Does the judge need any justification
for the deployment of that power beyond parties' preferences and accords?
Are all parties' resolutions equally valid or should the judge pick and choose
among them? And how are we, who are neither parties nor judge, to view
the power of judges and parties as vacatur is requested and granted?
Vacatur on consent is a particularly vivid example of judicial power
unadorned by justifications external to the parties' desires and the judges'
own views, unsupported by the act of adjudication. Of course, consent
decrees, managerial judging, and judicial involvement in alternative dispute
resolution raise parallels, but in the expansive pretrial phase and sometimes
229. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
230. See supra, notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
231. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4, 40-44 (1983).
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in the tumult of the trial itself, judicial action may be obscured or
blurred.2 32  But after the morass of facts and law are-in the
vernacular-"reduced to judgment," a clarity appears. And whatever the
breadth or nature of the decision written, a single piece of paper, specific,
concrete, definitive, the "judgment," marks both symbolically and practically
that the courts have spoken.
33
Thus, crossing the proverbial Rubicon from trial to appellate court is not
transformative; rather, it is the change from ambiguity to clarity that occurs
whenever litigation is reduced to judgments that makes vacatur on consent
so evocative. Because both trial and appellate courts cross that
line-pronounce "the law"-it is distressing to see those pronouncements
rejected for reasons unrelated to law, right, and fact.234
But appellate courts do play a special role in vacatur on consent. First,
because of the relatively brief window of time to file a notice of appeal (and
232. Judicial power, and its unclear boundaries, are visible in the law growing
around consent decrees. The ever-more frequent amalgam of limited fact-finding
followed by consent gives rise to confusion about what was adjudicated compared
to what the parties negotiated. Compare the majority opinion in Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755, 759 (1989), with Justice Stevens' dissent, id. at 769 (disagreeing about
what the trial court had found, as compared to what the parties had settled). See
also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 769 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the negotiated decree had to be understood in light of the
fact that prior "litigation had established the existence of a serious constitutional
violation").
The fuzziness of judicial authority and party agreement may enable some
compromises that might, with the clarity of factfinding, have not occurred, but
those consent judgments also preclude precedential pronouncements of legal right.
After consent decrees are entered, and are either challenged by third parties or the
litigants themselves, the question of enforcement arises. If no facts are found, no
legal rights announced, exactly why should the state's authority flow to enforce
the bargains struck? Current doctrine documents that problem: consent is not
always a basis equal to fact-finding for purposes of coercive enforcement. As the
line between what is "law" and what is "contract" blurs, judges' capacity to enforce
the "judgments" borne of the mixture may diminish. Compare the doctrine that
federal court remedial authority is dependent upon the scope of liability established.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977).
As "judicial decisions" become increasingly based on parties' consent, and if, over
time, parties either differ in their descriptions of that to which they consented or
of who had consented to what, the problem of justification of the exercise of
judicial authority becomes greater. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265,
275, 279 (1990) (reversing a district court's contempt sanction against members of the
City Council who had failed to vote in favor of legislation required to implement
a consent decree entered by the City of Yonkers).
233. See FED. R. CIV. P. 58 (the judgment is embodied in a separate piece of paper).
234. Thus, Judge Easterbrook's rule (In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir.
1988)) of no vacatur of decisions on consent is more coherent than Judge Kearse's
permission of vacatur of trial court but not appellate court opinions. See Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1993).
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thus to bargain about vacating a judgment) and because of the doctrine that,
with the filing of the notice of appeal, trial courts lose jurisdiction, appellate
courts become a frequent venue for much of the discussion of vacatur on
consent. Second, while trial judges have spent the last few decades visibly
refraining their image and admiring the results, appellate judges seem to have
had a more stable role.
Of course, the last decades have witnessed enormous changes in some
aspects of appellate court work. Appellate judges have dockets that are many
times the size of those only a few decades ago.235 Further, as Professor
Yeazell instructs, because so much of litigation has moved to earlier phases,
appellate courts have a diminished role in supervising the trial courts in any
given case.236  But whether harried or less in control of the trial bench,
whether selecting the cases to decide, whether deciding cases without
publication or by delegation, appellate judges still appear to be doing
adjudication-pronouncing law, derived from some understanding of facts and
principles. Even when appellate judges advocate settlement, they have
maintained a disinterested stance. Unlike trial judges, they do not negotiate
directly with the parties for settlement but rather assign delegatees who, in
theory and practice, are charged with engaging in conversations never to be
heard by the appellate judges called upon to sit in judgment.237 Further,
while alterations such as increased numbers of unpublished opinions,
delegation to staff, and the curtailment of oral argument have become
commonplace, appellate judges have not spoken of a major revision of their
charge nor rejoiced in the reformatted appellate procedure. Rather, appellate
judges continue to claim their role is the business of law announcement.
238
235. See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the
Federal Courts, 1993 WiS. L. REV. 1, 2-3 ("In 1958, all the federal courts together had 64
circuit judgeships.... Today, those numbers have swelled to 167 .... Judicial
business increased from 1958's 3700 appeals.., to 42,000 appeals .... ").
236. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994 Wis.
L. REV. 631.
237. See S.R. Mercantile Corp. v. Maloney, 909 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Discussions
in [Civil Appeals Management Program] conferences are confidential and are not to
be revealed to members of the Court.") (citing Soliman v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 822
F.2d. 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988) and Lake Utopia Paper Ltd.
v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1076 (1980)).
238. See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1987) ("the
responsibility for maintaining the law's uniformity is a responsibility of appellate
rather than trial judges"). One might also argue a growing divergence between the
functions of trial and appellate judges and that the two sets of judges will over
time be seen as in increasingly different positions. Differing rules on vacatur on
consent might both reflect and create distinctions between trial and appellate
court tasks.
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Could one use the ostensible stability of the appellate bench's function
to resuscitate a trial/appellate court distinction with respect to the propriety
of vacatur on consent? Vacatur on appeal lets that mask slip; appellate judges
openly use their power as they acquiesce to parties' demands. Vacatur on
consent is thus a troubling form of judicial involvement in settlement because
it makes visible a judicial act of power (whether by trial or appellate court) to
"set aside" or "vacate" or "erase" or "wipe away" or "withdraw" prior adjudi-
cation (whether one's own or that of a another court). Further, when such
power is deployed by appellate judges (who often offer reasons couched in law
rather than in parties' consent), that power evokes concerns greater than
when trial judges, managing and settling cases or entering consent decrees,
undertake fundamentally similar tasks. The problem is not so much about
asymmetry of litigants' resources, or utility, or history and tradition or trial
versus appellate court than it is about sheer power and the desire both to
explain and confine judicial exercises of power.
IV. CONCLUSION
Two-conflicting-evaluations of the exercise of that power and, in turn,
of the mission of courts are available. With those evaluations come two
competing endings to this essay. The first sees that deployment of power,
without more, impoverishes the judge. Finality bows not, as it has under
some regimes because "truth" or "fairness" demands it, nor because of "the
incessant command of the court's conscience that justice be done in light of
all the facts," '239 but because parties so desire. To the extent one imagines
239. Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 102 (1979) (quoting Bankers
Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970))
(emphasis in original). Rule 60(b) requires "engag[ing] in the delicate balancing of
'the sanctity of final judgments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and . . .
justice."' Id. The Compton court voided the judgment for damages because it had "no
basis whatsoever either in fact or law." Id. at 107.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for courts to "relieve
a party ... from a final judgment" under six conditions. Unlike vacatur on consent,
Rule 60(b) motions are typically sought by one party and opposed by the other. The
first five bases for correction specified in the rule are "mistake," new evidence, fraud,
a judgment that is void because of jurisdictional defects, and one that has been
satisfied or reversed. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(5). The sixth category authorizes
relief for "any other reason justifying relief." For analysis of case law under the
Rule, see Mary Kay Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 41, 69 (1978) (discussing the tradeoffs between "finality," which entails
"occasional unjust results," and permitting relief, because "truth must be our
mistress despite the degree of uncertainty that will result"); James Wm. Moore &
Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623 (1946) (explaining
that the rule was animated by the need to provide means to respond to judicial
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judges as upon occasion "speaking truth to power,"2" vacatur on consent
is an act without this possibility. It is an act of silence, of power that negates
what judges and jurors have said the law requires. Further, it cuts off judicial
conversation not only with the state but with the public, third parties who
watch and understand both their polity and their own rights and obligations
better when they hear judges speak. Thus, those who bemoan its advent
might be understood as discussing the impoverishment of the judicial role.
These tales of judging cannot be told when judges cease to fumble towards
their best approximations of truth.
While doctrine can justify vacatur on consent, just as doctrine,
legislation, and court rules can provide the bases for judicial authority to press
for settlement and even suggest the terms, doctrine cannot fill the loss of
greater aspirations for judges. Nor can doctrine and legislation provide the
political answer to why judges have such powers. If judges know nothing
about the respective legal rights and obligations between the parties, the
quality of the adjudications or the deal subsequently struck, there is little
basis for judicial wisdom to advise on appropriate or desirable outcomes.
Only power, not wisdom, is deployed.
While Congress, the rulemakers, and state and federal courts can
stipulate to such wisdom, the judges who receive such grants of authority
perhaps should be less welcoming of these changes. 41 Not only might the
errors, stemming from fraud, negligence, inadvertence, as well as new circum-
stances, and depending upon a showing by the parties).
According to the United States Supreme Court, Rule 60(b) authorizes courts to
"vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice."
Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949) (authorizing the setting aside
of a default judgment that had deprived a citizen of his citizenship; at the time of the
proceeding, the defendant was incarcerated, and he was never afforded a hearing
or counsel).
240. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179,
200 (1985), reprinted in ROBERT M. COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS
OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, & Austin Sarat, eds., 1992).
241. Indeed, some members of the Article III judiciary objected to aspects of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA)-arguing that Congress was inappropriately
intruding on and managing the judiciary. See Diana E. Murphy, The Concerns of Federal
Judges, 74 JUDICATURE 112 (1990) (systemic delays were not demonstrated; there was a
failure to consider issues related to the criminal docket; and the mandatory nature
of proposed legislation was inappropriate); Marvin E. Aspen, The Biden Bill, JUDGES' J.,
Fall, 1990, at 23, 47 (The Judicial Conference "played a key role in opposing the Biden
bill's provisions ... that [stemmed from] a flawed committee report of the Brookings
Institution .... [that urged legislation to] micromanage civil litigation."); Stephen
Labaton, Business and the Law: Biden's Challenge to Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1990, at
D2 ("heavy opposition from the bench"). However, in response to the legislative
effort, the Judicial Conference approved a "14-point program to address the problems
of cost and delay in civil litigation" and like the CJRA, emphasized case management
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polity be nervous about how to constrain the managerial and vacating judge,
but judges given those tasks might themselves pause to wonder what other
changes in job descriptions are coming and whether those roles are ones to
invite. One hundred years of managerial judging, of judicial promotion of
alternatives to themselves, and of appellate court exercises of power may not
provide the basis for much respect for the Third Branch. When trial and
appellate judges reveal themselves as brokers and dealmakers, then there is
no judgment, only power, and judges themselves may be "held for naught."
The second ending rejects the framing offered by those who object to
vacatur on consent. The office of the judge is not impoverished by the
invention of new procedural options, it is enriched. Defenders of vacatur on
consent may understand it not as a collapse of the judicial role but as a
marker of expanding judicial horizons to focus more specifically on parties'
needs. Here the focus shifts. Instead of Coverian judges speaking truth to
power (engaged in a conversation with the kingly or government authority
that actually gives the judiciary its jurisdiction), judges are in conversation
with litigants, less powerful than they, but with greater insight into their own
needs. Courts see themselves as social service organizations, counseling and
aiding, and whenever possible, deferring. Adjudication is a default action,
undertaken only as a last resort. Wise judges, from this vantage point, are
those who know the limits of their understanding and who undo their own
or other judges' and jurors' actions as evidence that all third-party mandates
are inferior to parties' own decisions.242 Appellate judges, like trial judges,
know that litigation can continue, that risks-not only of additional appellate
review but of trial court decisionmaking on remand-remain after appellate
decisionmaking, and accede to parties' requests to facilitate settlement.243
Under this vision, this procedural innovation and others provide not
only descriptive lessons but also a normative tale: that rebellion against the
and alternative dispute resolution, including various modes of encouraging settle-
ment. See Judicial Conference Approves Plan to Improve Civil Case Management, THIRD BRANCH,
May, 1990, at 1.
242. Recall that the Kaisha parties argued for vacatur on consent in part because
their resolution was more "just" than that the courts imposed. See supra note 120.
Recall also that in Bonner Mall, the argument is made that because a party is willing
to settle, the inference is that the legal basis of that party's victory is vulnerable.
See supra notes 118-121.
243. Under either of these visions, vacatur of the Ninth Circuit decision in Bonner
Mal is not required, for no one claimed that its vacatur was a necessary element to
achieve the agreement. The after-the-fact request suggests either a fear of
freighting the bargain in that manner or inadvertent neglect of that issue, neither
of which should be a basis for court vacatur. Cf. Bates v. Union Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647
(9th Cir. 1991), discussed supra note 127.
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contours of adjudication is widespread; that perceptions of its limits are
sufficient to call for reframing of the enterprise itself; that when parties to a
dispute claim their resolution to be superior to that of a court, their views are
not a trivial reason for deploying the power of the court but a profoundly
important justification for exercising that power. To explain that an exercise
of judicial power is undertaken because parties so desire is the vindication of
a regime that installs preferences of the parties as the best measure of fairness
available.
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